开始:VCALENDAR版本:2.0 PRODID: / /学院Labor Economics//Zope//EN METHOD:PUBLISH CALSCALE:GREGORIAN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/Berlin BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU DTSTART:19810329T020000 TZNAME:CEST TZOFFSETTO:+0200 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0200 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU DTSTART:19961027T030000 TZNAME:CET TZOFFSETTO:+0100 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:8391097532000@conference.iza.org LOCATION;CHARSET=UTF-8: DESCRIPTION:In my asymmetric-information model of layoffs, high-productivity workers are more likely to be recalled to their former employer and may choose to remain unemployed rather than to accept a low-wage job. In this case, unemployment can serve as a signal of productivity, and duration of unemployment may be positively related to post-laid-off wages even among workers who are not recalled. In contrast, because workers whose plant closed cannot be recalled, longer unemployment for them should not have a positive signaling benefit. Analysis of the data from the January 1988-2000 Displaced Workers Supplements to the Current Population Survey reveals that the wage/unemployment duration relation differs between laid-off workers and workers displaced through plant closings in the predicted way, and finds evidence consistent with asymmetric information in the U.S. labor market. SEQUENCE:1 X-APPLE-TRAVEL-ADVISORY-BEHAVIOR:AUTOMATIC SUMMARY:IZA Seminar: Signaling in the Labor Market: New Evidence on Layoffs and Plant Closings by N�ria Rodr�guez-Planas (Queens College, CUNY) DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20041012T000000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:T000000 END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR