开始:VCALENDAR版本:2.0 PRODID: / /学院Labor Economics//Zope//EN METHOD:PUBLISH CALSCALE:GREGORIAN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/Berlin BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU DTSTART:19810329T020000 TZNAME:CEST TZOFFSETTO:+0200 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0200 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU DTSTART:19961027T030000 TZNAME:CET TZOFFSETTO:+0100 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:30341496786400@conference.iza.org LOCATION;CHARSET=UTF-8: DESCRIPTION:Recent research and policies use (often small) incentives for students to increase their years of schooling. A working assumption justifying such incentives is that the optimal years of schooling is greater than that which would be otherwise be obtained by the target population. I combine this hypothesis with an older literature (e.g., Harberger 1971) that uses triangles to estimate approximate misallocation. Using well-identified parameter estimates from recent papers, I implement two strategies to measure the loss to a student from an underinvestment of (a somewhat implausible) four years of school. The upper bound of the present value of losses from supposed underinvestment in schooling is less than a few percent of lifetime income, in certain plausible cases. As these triangles are proportional to the square of misallocation and would thus be smaller by a factor of 8 with just one year of underinvestment. SEQUENCE:1 X-APPLE-TRAVEL-ADVISORY-BEHAVIOR:AUTOMATIC SUMMARY:IZA Seminar: A Nudge to School: Triangulating the Gains by Hoyt Bleakley (University of Michigan) DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20170607T000000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20170607T000000 END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR