2019年2月

IZA DP No. 12136:工作调整成本和激励:来自残疾保险计划的证据

发表于:《公共经济学杂志》,第188卷,2020年8月,104223。(下载:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272720300876)

当个人面临由政策变化引起的工作激励变化时,调整成本对他们有多重要?我通过利用大幅增加工作激励的政策变化,提供了对异质调整成本的初步估计。政策的改变提高了残疾保险项目的豁免门槛。我记录了人们对工作激励的强烈反应,因为我观察到,就在收入的边际税较低的免税门槛以下,出现了过量的群体(“聚集”)。一个令人困惑的观察是,在政策改变后,个人继续聚集在原来的阈值。这一发现表明,他们在改变劳动力供应时面临调整成本。我使用新的和以前阈值上的聚束量来估计调整成本,调整成本因个人的工作能力而异。能力较低的个体估计调整成本较高;从零到20%不等,平均为8%。考虑到异质性调整成本,收入相对于净税率的弹性估计为0.2,是不考虑调整成本时弹性估计的两倍。 To investigate the relative size of the adjustment costs to the work incentives induced by the policy change, I evaluate the overall effect of the policy change on the labor supply using a Difference-in-Differences design. I find that individuals who already work, work more, and those who did not work, start working. Policies designed to increase labor supply will work if the induced work incentives are large enough to offset the adjustment costs. Accounting for adjustment costs then might explain disparate findings on the effects of an increase in work incentives on labor supply in disability insurance programs. These findings have important implications for designing policies and targeting heterogeneous groups to increase labor supply in disability insurance programs.