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Global Economic, Political and Social Values:  
The Case of Turkey**

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## ABSTRACT

### **Testing an EU-Candidate's Place on the Maps of Global Economic, Political and Social Values: The Case of Turkey**

Following the attempt by Alesina and Guiliano (2013) to measure global culture and to project these measurements onto real choropleth geographical world maps, we utilize the data from the *World Values Survey* (WVS) to arrive at robust measurement scales of global economic, political and social values and to assess Turkey's place on them. Our study, which is based on 92,289 representative individuals with complete data in 68 countries, representing 56.89% of the global population, looks at hard-core economic values in the countries. From our new nine dimensions for the determination of the geography of human values, based on a promax factor analysis of the available data, we use six factor analytical scores to calculate a new Global Value Development Index, which combines: avoiding economic permissiveness; avoiding racism; avoiding distrust of the army and the press; avoiding the authoritarian character; tolerance and respect; and avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy. Our results show that the five best ranked countries are all western democracies. Our global value development index ranks Morocco twelfth – just behind the USA. Turkey is ranked 25, ahead of several EU member countries. But there are still considerable deficits concerning the liberal values components, which are very important for effective democracy, and there are very large regional differences, confirming the dictum by Huntington (1996) about Turkey as a torn country. The deficits suggest that the Turkish state, Turkish civil society and European decision makers would be well advised to continue to support civil society and secular democracy in Turkey.

JEL Classification: C43, F50, Z12, D73

Keywords: index numbers and aggregation, international relations, international political economy, religion, bureaucracy, administrative processes, corruption

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## 1. Introduction

Whatever way, the European Union (EU) candidate Turkey's internal and external developments will sharply divide opinions around Europe and beyond (Clesse and Tashan, 2004). And whatever way, the scientific study of opinion and value structures and processes in the context of EU enlargement in Turkey, the other candidate countries and in the EU-28 and beyond are an absolute necessity. Following the new attempt by Alesina and Guiliano (2013), to measure global culture and to project these measurement scales onto real choropleth geographical world maps, we also utilize the freely available data from the *World Values Survey (WVS)* at the University of Michigan<sup>1</sup> to arrive at such robust and similar measurement scales of global economic, political and social values and we attempt to place Turkey on them. The contribution by Alesina and Guiliano (2013) is such an important study for this moment in Europe, because it allows social science to make solid and scientific judgments, where usually only prejudice against or in favor of Turkey's hotly contested EU-accession prevails. And whatever the shortcomings of our analysis may be, our attempt should be judged at the end of the day by the methodological innovation it attempts.

Our central question in this essay is thus what is Turkey's place on realistic new maps of global values, given that the existing sociological cross-national value comparisons are insufficient? The aim of this essay is thus two-fold: to build such new global value maps, and to see what the implications for Turkey and its unhappy relationship with the EU are. The study will hopefully become not only a contribution to the academic debate on the subject, but also a useful tool for the decision makers in international politics. The methodology put forward here can also help decision makers to assess the value structures in other EU enlargement candidate countries, and also can help the decision makers in other continents – like Latin America or the ASEAN countries, or in international organizations, like the United Nations, the OECD, the World Bank etc. to arrive at sounder judgments about economic, social and political basic values, prevalent in a given country.

The systematic use of large-scale comparative international opinion data, above all from the *WVS*, which we undertake here, is not new and not anymore restricted to the sociological discipline. More and more, the economics discipline becomes aware of the enormous possibilities to address the contentious issues of culture in the economics of a global society, characterized more and more by migration and the globalization of world religions. Global value research, which originally grew out of the desire of large transnational corporations (i.e. IBM Corporation) to adapt to ever more complex and pluralistic cultural patterns of their clients and staff (Minkov, 2009; Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 2013) by now is a long-established social science discipline, and it is a pity how little the overall European public and especially the decision makers took notice about its results in the debate about Turkish EU-accession so far.

Sociology, for sure, did its “homework” and there are even attempts to arrive at realistic assessments of global Muslim and Arab Muslim opinion in a comparative perspective. Sociology, looking already back on a very long established tradition of the empirical sociology of religions, which dates back to the 19<sup>th</sup> Century (Morel, 2003), contributed greatly over the last two decades towards understanding global Muslim opinion (Diez-Nicolas, 2007, 2010; Moaddel, 2002, 2003, 2008; Tessler, 2003, just to mention a few).

At this stage, the comparative social scientist and economist might wonder perhaps whether all the debate that rages on the issue under scrutiny here – i.e. Turkey's place as a European nation - is really well-informed by the evidence from quantitative social science on the subject. Turkey, the country of origin of around some 70% of the 3.5 million Muslims

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

residing in Germany,<sup>2</sup> from the early beginnings was an integral part of the WVS Project. The deficit of the European political debate to take into account the results of systematic social science research on the issue of Turkey is all the more depressing, since the systematic use of data from the WVS in advanced social science Turkish studies is now commonplace (Erişen, Erişen and Özkeçeci-Taner, 2013; Negrón-Gonzales, 2012; Sarigil, 2011; Şimşek, 2013; Yeşilada, 2002; Yeşilada and Noordijk, 2010).

Confronted by a European public debate, which is threatening to become “*essentialistic*” on both sides of the great “*Turkish EU-membership divide*”, it is necessary to recall at the outset that for advanced research in the economics discipline, the question about the relationship between economics and religion is not new. The essay by Barro and McCleary (2003) is a good example of how today economic research uses data from the WVS Project to study the relationship between religion, denominations and economic growth. Alesina (2013); Alesina and Angeletos (2005); Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007); Alesina and Guiliano (2010, 2011, 2013); Alesina, Cozzi and Mantovan (2012); and Alesina, di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) all show how the economic discipline can indeed gain hard-core, quantitative and valuable insights from comparative knowledge about such phenomena as generalized trust and social capital, individualism, family ties, morality, attitudes toward work and perception of poverty, and religious practice for economic processes. In this essay, we will attempt without hesitation to define “cultures” largely following Alesina and Guiliano (2013) on a global scale, and also in Turkey.

In our attempt to openly test the often unspoken but politically very relevant contention by many members of the European political class and the public at large that in the end Turkey does not really belong to Europe because it’s a Muslim country<sup>3</sup> (see below) by advanced international data and advanced quantitative methods, like Promax oblique factor analysis, we use 30 indicators from the WVS. Although some of our indicators are different from those used by Alesina and Guiliano (2013), there is lots of resemblance between the two approaches, and a high correspondence between the choropleth geographical maps of global values, presented by Alesina and Guiliano, and our own attempts will emerge. There are, nevertheless, some differences in the approach: we uniformly use promax oblique factor analysis to test the relationships between the value factors. Our chosen indicators represent the best available choice of WVS data in terms of interview coverage, and in addition, our results – in contrast to those reported by Alesina and Guiliano, also contain important social, economic and political background variables.

In the course of our research, we are going to present data not only at the national, but also at the regional level of the slightly less than 70 nations compared here, analyzing the factor analytical scores of our new nine global value indicators, derived from over 90.000 representative interviews across the globe and also in the Turkish regions, and we will compare their performance with those of all other regions of the world with available data and a sufficient number of reported WVS interview partners per region (i.e. n>30). In that process we will discover the still existing deep regional value cleavages which exist in Turkey, benefiting the ruling conservative Islamist AKP, whose power-base is the urban and rural poor Turkish speaking Sunni Muslim majority population from Anatolia.

In designing this research project, we made the discovery that hitherto existing attempts in sociology to draw maps of human values across nations (i.e. Hofstede and Inglehart), valuable as they may be, are really still unsatisfactory in terms of country coverage, issue coverage and also methodologies used. Thus, besides background variables, like age, gender, education

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/germany/>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.dw.de/turkey-not-fit-for-eu-accession-sarkozy/a-14875593>

level, life satisfaction, educational values, values of responsibility, general political attitudes on the left-right scale, identification with democracy, general social capital variables (trust in people, in the armed forces, in the Press) and religious attitudes, our study in particular looks at hard-core economic values, in all countries of the world with available data, namely:

1. Competition good or harmful (competition policy, admission of a free market)
2. Migration policy (prevent people from coming) (migration policy)
3. Important child qualities: hard work (attitudes towards work)
4. Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport (attitudes towards public services; limited morality)
5. Justifiable: cheating on taxes (tax evasion and shadow economy)
6. Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them (attitudes towards public services, work attitudes)
7. Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe (corruption)
8. Rejecting neighbors: immigrants/foreign workers (economic and social discrimination)
9. Neighbors: People of a different race (economic and social discrimination)
10. University is more important for a boy than for a girl (economic and social discrimination).

Fascinating relationships between the underlying factors, explaining these 30 variables, and which render themselves for objective and value-free comparisons will emerge, and we will also be able to name for each country of the world the exact position it has on those factors. We will be able to show the regional cleavages for those factors, and we will be able to say whether Turkey's population has attitudes which are different from or are similar to other current EU-candidate countries, like Macedonia. We will be able to judge whether in principle there exist really fundamental value differences between Turkey and the rest of Europe, disqualifying Turkey *ex ante* from EU membership – or not. These results will hold irrespective of recent political tendencies in the country, connected with the Gezi Park protest movement.

Rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general picture of Turkey *ante portas*. Section 3 discuss the political economy and sociology of global values. The overlooked role of the shadow economy in assessing global values is analyzed in Section 4. The methodology is outlined in Section 5. Section 6 is on re-analysis of Inglehart's data. The final factor analytical model is presented in Section 7 followed by the new choropleth maps of global human values in Section 8. In Section 9 we discuss regional value differences at the sub-national level and in the final Section Turkey - a Torn Country? Conclusions and Perspectives are presented.

## 2. Turkey *ante portas*

In our view, the culturalist “debate” about “*Islam in Europe*”, focusing on “*Islam as such*” (“*Islam an sich*”), leaves no room for the legitimate concerns of those who indeed fear that the secular Republic established by Kemal Atatürk is progressively being undermined by a powerful and increasingly authoritarian political leadership, which so handsomely won yet another victory at the polls in 2014, all the protest movement in the major cities around Gezi Park notwithstanding.<sup>4</sup> But this essay is not on Turkish internal politics, but, if you like, on comparative values “*as such*”, regardless of one's stand in the often controversial and bitter cleavages now surfacing in Turkish society.

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/04/turkeys-regime-fails-abroad-is-world-champion-at-fundamental-transformation-at-home/>

Many international observers, among them Toghil (2012), found that the real issues in Turkish accession indeed have nothing to do with legal criteria, economic requirements or international relations. The problem, Toghil argues, is really simply that of admitting a large Muslim country into the EU. But it's often forgotten that the then French overseas department of Algeria with a largely Muslim population was an integral part of the then "*European Economic Community*" from January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1958 right to July 5<sup>th</sup>, 1962, the day when Algeria became independent.<sup>5</sup> When Algeria joined the European Economic Community, no Copenhagen criteria were in place, and a bitter counter-insurgency war was being fought with tens of thousands of victims. So adherents of Turkey's EU-accession might say that Muslim Algeria as a colony with a bitter civil war was welcome as a European Economic Community member, but not Turkey.

With almost 30 years since the Turkish Republic's application to join the European Economic Community in 1987, and almost 20 years since the country was declared eligible to join the EU in 1997, the EU one way or the other, Europe will have to reach a decision<sup>6</sup> how to proceed. Already in 1997 it was declared eligible to join the EU. Turkey's involvement with European integration dates way back to 1959 and includes the Ankara Association Agreement (1963) for the progressive establishment of a Customs Union (ultimately set up in 1995).<sup>7</sup>

Countries preparing to join the EU today are: Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo as potential candidates and Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey<sup>8</sup> as official candidates. As a glance at the United States Central Intelligence Agency "*World Factbook*" will convince every reader of this article very quickly,<sup>9</sup> these countries are characterized by the following Muslim share of population: Turkey (99.8%), Albania (56.7%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (40%), Macedonia (33.3%), Montenegro (19.1%), and Serbia (3.1%).

### **3. The political economy and sociology of global values**

Alesina and Guiliano (2013) define culture to comprise measurable tendencies in the following variables: generalized trust, individualism versus collectivism, family ties, generalized vs. limited morality, attitudes toward work and perception of poverty and religion.

The most studied cultural trait, according to Alesina and Guiliano (2013) is the measure of generalized trust toward others. The importance of this trait cannot, as argued by Alesina and Guiliano, cannot be overemphasized. They mention that, every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust; and economic backwardness in the world can following economist Kenneth Arrow, be explained precisely by the lack of mutual confidence. The *WVS* asks respondents around the globe: "*Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful when dealing with others?*" Nowadays, there is, Alesina and Guiliano highlight, a vast literature showing a close connection between trust and economic development. Generalized vs. limited morality are also, Alesina and Guiliano argue, relevant in fostering economic development. Limited morality exists where cooperative behavior is extended only towards immediate family members, whereas generalized morality exists where cooperative behavior is extended toward everyone in society.

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.eui.eu/Research/HistoricalArchivesOfEU/News/2013/07-30-EurafricaandDeGaullesConstantinePlan.aspx>

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-338454-merkel-reiterates-doubts-on-turkeys-eu-membership-but-supports-talks.html>

<sup>7</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-current-status/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-current-status/index_en.htm)

<sup>8</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey/index_en.htm)

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>



Among the most prominent competing international sociological attempts to define and measure the development of human values we should specify the current two major approaches dominating international social science: Hofstede's theory of global values and Inglehart's and his associates' studies of world values.

First we mention Geert Hofstede. This Dutch psychologist and his associates really stood at the beginning of comparative international value research. Initially, they based their empirical studies on global culture on the statistical analysis of the staff of the single US transnational enterprise IBM in 40 different countries around the world (see also Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 2013). According to Hofstede and his school, there are four to six basic clusters of international value systems, and they are all defined along the scales of how different national societies handle ways of coping with inequality, ways of coping with uncertainty, the relationship of the individual with her or his primary group, and the emotional implications of having been born as a girl or as a boy. Hofstede defines these dimensions of national culture as: power distance, individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, uncertainty avoidance index, long-term orientation and indulgence versus restraint.

Between 1990 and 2002, Hofstede replicated these dimensions in six other cross-national studies on very different populations from consumers to airline pilots, covering between 14 and 28 countries. In the 2010 third edition of his book *'Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind'*, scores on the dimensions are listed for 76 countries.<sup>10</sup> But – perhaps somewhat surprisingly for large sections of the European public, -the ranks of Turkey on the global Hofstede scales are absolutely unspectacular and are somewhere in the middle of global society based on sample of 62 countries: uncertainty avoidance index (18), power distance (25), indulgence versus restraint (27), individualism vs. collectivism (35), masculinity versus femininity (36) and long-term orientation (36). We only considered the countries with complete values for the final analysis.

Inglehart, in some of his main publications, developed by contrast an interpretation of global value change (Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel, 2003, 2005), which rests on a well-known two-dimensional scale of global values and global value change, which is based on the statistical technique of factor analysis of up to over twenty key WVS variables from the originally more than 900 survey items on practically all major areas of human concern, from religion to politics to economic and social life. Factor analysis reduces variables to the underlying statistical dimensions, and is based on a mathematical procedure, implemented today on most advanced statistical software packages for social statistics, like IBM SPSS.

The two Inglehart dimensions (see Inglehart and Baker, 2000, pp. 23-24) are: (i) the Traditional/ Secular-Rational dimension and (ii) the Survival/Self-expression dimension. These two dimensions also explain more than 70 percent of the cross-national variance in a factor analysis of ten indicators, and each of these dimensions is strongly correlated with scores of other important variables. The factor scores generated by these 10 items listed previously are highly correlated with factor scores from his earlier research. In a statistical Table in that landmark article, Inglehart and Baker also show the results from a factor analysis of variables with 165,594 WVS respondents (Inglehart and Baker, 2000, Table 1). As expected, the factor loadings are considerably lower than those at the national level, and are reproduced here below. The traditional values are defined by: God is very important in respondent's life (0.70), it is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determinations (0.61), abortion is never justifiable (0.61), respondent

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<sup>10</sup> <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures>



has strong sense of national pride (0.60) and respondent favors more respect for authority (0.51). The self-expression values are defined by: respondent gives priority to self-expression and quality-of-life (0.59), respondent describes self as very happy (0.58), respondent has signed and would sign a petition (0.59), homosexuality is always justifiable (0.54) and you should be trusting people (0.44).

For Inglehart and his associates, the rise of rational-secular values is an important element in socio-economic and democratic development. Self-expression values, as opposed to survival values, give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision making in economic and political life. For Inglehart, there is a dramatic shift in child-rearing values, from emphasis on hard work toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child in the course of socio-economic development. Societies that rank high on self-expression values also tend to rank high on interpersonal trust. The culture of trust and tolerance are crucial to democracy. Secularism (y-axis) and self-expression (x-axis) are but two sides of the same coin – modernity. The Inglehart School assumes the following global “*map of human values*”. In our adaption of the famous Inglehart map, we highlight the position of Turkey on it. Assuming that self-expression values rise in parallel with secular-rational values, it is clear that Turkey’s path corresponds to the “global path”.

Insert Graph 1: Map of global human values according to Inglehart and associates (our own adaption) and the place of Turkey on it.

Our own calculations show that Tanzania, Puerto Rico and Jordan are the least secular countries of the world, while Sweden, Japan and the Czech Republic are the most secular countries of the world. Turkey’s ranking needs a special comment here: while Turkey is more religious than most West European countries, it is as religious as the United States, Poland, and the Latin American democracies Chile and Brazil. Its rank 49 among the 66 countries is not sensational, replicating the earlier already mentioned tendency from Hofstede’s surveys. New Zealand, Australia and the United States are the most self-expression oriented countries of the world, while all of the five most survival oriented and least self-expression oriented countries of the world were of Orthodox Christian cultural heritage: Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Romania. So Turkey is rank 45 on the global self-expression scale, regarded by Inglehart and his associates to be so vital for “effective democracy”. Turkey is ahead of several countries of the EU, reminding our readers that self-expression values are defined by the priority to self-expression and quality-of-life, happiness, preparedness to sign a petition, tolerance vis-à-vis homosexuality, and trust in people. The results clearly suggest that the world of Christian Orthodoxy is the global region with the lowest self-expression values.

Our choropleth maps – Maps 1 and 2 – designed with Inglehart’s data, further highlight these aspects of the Inglehart global map of human values. Generally, one refers to the “map of human values” nowadays in the context of the famous Graph, designed by Inglehart and his associates, shown in Graph 1 of this essay. However, the design of real choropleth maps, i.e. e. maps designed to show global statistics on an easily readable world maps, which simplify the global data range to up to nine, ten or eleven layers (high, medium, low) brings about important insights into the essence of social scientific theories, and – even at the price of oversimplification – try to show to the audiences confronted with these theories where a given phenomenon is strongest or weakest.

Insert Map 1: Inglehart: Secular Values. Data from the WVS waves 1-4

Insert Map 2: Inglehart: Self-Expression Values. Data from the WVS waves 1-4

Inglehart and Baker (2000) also maintain that in traditional societies a main goal in life is to make one's parents proud and one must always love and respect one's parents, regardless of how they behave. Conversely, parents must do their best for their children even if their own well-being suffers. People in traditional societies idealize large families, and they actually have them. However, extensive evidence indicates that these values tap an intergenerational shift from an emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increased emphasis on self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality-of-life concerns. In contrast to the hitherto dominant explanations, we introduce the dimension of the shadow economy, acceptance of corruption, and overall moral decay (see also Schneider, 2005 Torgler and Schneider, 2007). And as we see in the results, this consideration of the dimension of economic permissiveness results in a significant redrawing of the global maps of human values.

#### **4. The overlooked role of the shadow economy in assessing global values**

It is clear that Hofstede and Inglehart neglected very important dimensions of economic and social life – the shadow economy, which is especially becoming more and more important in the process of the further enlargement of the EU. Let us just take one important example – the evaluation of a randomly picked current EU member candidate country, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The United States Department of States says in its country human rights report, issued in February 2014, referring to the government's failure to fully respect the rule of law, interfering in the judiciary and the media, and selective prosecution of political opponents, government corruption and police impunity, political interference, inefficiency, favoritism toward well placed persons, and corrupt judicial system.

Shadow economic activity has been on rise and causing violations of laws and regulations, lowering tax revenue collections, statistical discrepancies, inequality, corruption and public budget deficit and public debt problems for the state and its organizations. The shadow economy captures all the activities beyond measurement by official activity. In all countries, there is evidence that the shadow economy has a significant share of the overall economy. It is also labelled as hidden, black, underground, unobserved, unofficial, unrecorded, and parallel economies. The rise of the shadow economy around the world is attributed to the stronger presence of government activity, increase in tax rates, and the desire to escape taxes and regulatory restrictions. Tanzi and Schunecht (1997), Tanzi (1999), Schneider (2005), Eilat and Zinnes (2002), Ahumada et al. (2008) and Chaudhuri et al. (2006) shed light on the shadow economic activities, its measurement and development across developed, developing and transition economies.

There are several factors identified by researchers that are expected to have a negative association with the size of the shadow economy. These include trust (D'Hernoncourt and Meon, 2012), and tax morale and quality of institutions (Torgler and Schneider, 2009). Three key factors that their extent has impacted the size of shadow economy are: debt, default risk, corruption and financial development (Elgin and Uras, 2012; Blackburn et al., 2012), Information Communication Technologies (ICT) (Indjikian and Siegel, 2005) and environmental violations (Biswas et al., 2012).

The shadow economy is a key source of the gap between observable and actual economic measures. It captures all the activities beyond measurement by official activity and consists of both legal and illegal activities outside the reach of government. It makes up a significant share of the overall economy around the world. Other synonyms for the shadow economy are the hidden, black, underground, unobserved, unofficial, unrecorded, and parallel economies. There is evidence that underground activities have been on the rise since the 1970s. The rise is attributed to the stronger presence of government activity in the economies; the increase in tax

rates to finance larger public spending programs, and in parallel, the desire to escape taxes and regulatory restrictions has gained prominence (Tanzi and Schunehcht, 1997). Tanzi (1999) suggests that the shadow economy reaps because of the presence of activities that are difficult to measure and tax.

Schneider (2005) considers shadow economic activities a fact of life. Most societies attempt to reduce its magnitude by controlling activities through legal measures such as punishment and persecution or by preventive measures with investment in welfare and education. Despite significant investment in the collection of data on shadow economic activities, it is rather difficult to obtain accurate information about its nature and magnitude. Schneider mentions the existence of a comprehensive literature on particular aspects of the shadow economy, but the subject remains controversial. Furthermore, there is disagreement among researchers about the definition, estimation procedures and their use in economic analysis and policy making.

In a common approach, Schneider (2005) defines the shadow economy to include all market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons: (i) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, (ii) to avoid payment of social security contributions, (iii) to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, and (iv) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures. However, this definition does not include economic activities that are illegal and fit the characteristics of classical crime, as well as the informal household economy or tax evasion.

In another approach Eilat and Zinnes (2002) treat the shadow economy as a distinct entity, instead of seeing it just as a symptom of policy failures of the transition countries. They examine its short-term and dynamic consequences for development. The shadow economy is measured in two different ways: first, the electricity method which attributes growth in total electricity consumption in excess of growth in GDP to the shadow economy, and the second measure is a modified electricity approach correcting for limitations in the first approach.

Yet in a third approach, Ahumada et al. (2008) look at the monetary measure of the shadow economy where the money demand function, observed cash balances, and its variation which is explained by variables which induce agents to make hidden transactions is used to estimate the size of the shadow economy. However, on econometric grounds, researchers have criticized the quantitative accuracy of this method. The critique is attributed to time series properties, structural breaks and sensitivity to units of measurement to lag the dependent variable and its initial condition.

Limited statistics from high income countries point to a positive trend in shadow economic activities development, but yet little is known about its magnitude in transition, low-income and emerging economies. Schneider (2005) estimates the shadow economy for 110 countries (66 developing, 23 transition and 21 industrialized OECD) observed for 1990/1991, 1994/1995 and 1999/2000. The results provide some insights about the main causes and studies the dynamic effects of the shadow economy. The main causes of the shadow economy are found to be the tax and social security contribution burdens, the intensity of regulations and the low quality of public sector services.

The transition economies have undergone major changes. Increased unemployment, decline in GDP, a paralyzed bureaucracy and government corruption during this period saw a surge in the growth of shadow economic activities. Eilat and Zinnes (2002) conducted research on the shadow economy in transition countries. The objective was to use a policy perspective to find out whether shadow economy is a “friend” or a “foe”. The research was conducted in three

parts: it lays out the theoretical and empirical backgrounds, it estimates the size of the shadow economy, and it examines its effects and discusses issues of policy implementation.

For the empirical part, Eilat and Zinnes (2002) measures the relative size of the shadow economy to official GDP in 25 transition countries for the period 1990 to 1997. The patterns show that, once established, the shadow economy is hard to remove. Estimation results show that a dollar decline (rise) in official GDP is attenuated by a shadow economic expansion (contraction) of 31 (25) cents. Finally the authors examine whether the shadow economy prevents, slows down, or promotes economic growth and competitiveness, and through what mechanisms. In addition, they consider implications for policymaking that address the key questions. The policy recommendations include: actions with multiple benefits, actions that directly target the shadow economy, actions whose effectiveness is changed by the shadow economy, and implementation considerations.

Schneider (2005), in the context of industrialized and transition economies, mentions that the shadow economy is expected to influence the tax system and its structure, the efficiency of resource allocation between sectors, and the official economy in a dynamic sense. Therefore, several studies have integrated underground economies into macroeconomic models to facilitate investigation of the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the formal and informal economies and economic growth. In the neoclassical view, the underground economy is assumed to provide the economy with dynamic entrepreneurial spirit. It can lead to greater competition and higher efficiency, help to create markets, increase financial resources, enhance entrepreneurship, and transform the legal, social, and economic institutions necessary for accumulation providing a higher potential for economic growth.

Schneider (2005) concludes that for all countries investigated, the shadow economy as share of GDP has reached a remarkably large size (Africa 33.9-41.2; Americas 34.2-41.5; Asia 20.9-26.3; Transition countries 31.5-37.9 and highly developed countries 13.2-16.8). The average percentage shares of GDP in all cases are increasing over time. The author demonstrates empirically a strong interaction of the shadow economy with government policies and with the official economy. He draws three further conclusions. First, an increasing burden of taxation and social security payments, combined with rising state regulatory activities, are the major driving forces underlying the size and growth of the shadow economy. Second, the shadow economy has a statistically significant and quantitatively important influence on the growth of the official economy. Increases in the shadow economy have a negative effect on the official growth in a developing country, but a positive effect in the developed industrialized and transition countries. Finally, shadow economies are a complex phenomenon, and are present in all types of economies. People engage in shadow economic activity because of government actions, most notably high levels of taxation and regulation.

There are several factors that are expected to have a negative association with the size of shadow economy. These include trust, tax morale, and quality of institutions. Some researchers, explaining the shadow economy, go beyond the objective variables such as the tax burden, rate of public expenditure, or the density of regulation, and use subjective variables such as perceptions, expectations, attitudes and motivations such as tax morale or institutional quality. The relationship between tax morale and institutional quality and the shadow economy is investigated by Torgler and Schneider (2009). The shadow economy is measured as a percentage of the official GDP. WVS/European Values Survey data on cheating on taxes and Latinobarometro data on the justifiability of avoiding paying taxes are measures of tax morale, and the quality of governance index is used as a proxy for institutional quality. They use a multivariate analysis to examine the quantitative impact of these factors on the level of and changes in the shadow economy. They find strong support for

the hypothesis that higher tax morale and a higher institutional quality lead to a smaller shadow economy.

Another factor with significant potential impact on the size of shadow economy is trust. Trust can be a substitute to formal and legal contracts in a situation when the agents involved in shadow transactions cannot rely upon the formal legal system to enforce agreements or settle disputes. This view suggests that trust increases the size of the formal sector by negatively impacting the size of the informal sector. In this regard, D'Hernoncourt and Meon (2012) investigate the relationship between trust and the size of shadow economy. They report a negative relationship between the size of the shadow economy and generalized trust. The data include 145 countries from both developed and developing countries observed over the period 1999-2003. Trust is defined as the trust index provided in the WVS data. Comprehensive sensitivity analyses conducted confirm that the relationship is robust to controlling for various sets of factors. Trust and the shadow economy are negatively related and trust matters more for developing countries.

## 5. Methodology

Following the introduction of the meanwhile world-famous Human Development Index and its annual updates in the Human Development Report in recent years (see UNDP, 2013) a more rich literature on the quantitative measurement of development outcomes has been developed. These outcomes are often multidimensional and each of the dimensions is represented by several indicators with both positive and negative effects on the development outcome. In this study the objective is not only to evaluate the effects of certain policy programs, but also to quantify the state of the outcome. The multidimensionality of the outcome requires the creation of composite indices to have a single measure of performance and also to aggregate the indicators to rank the units in one unique way.

Examples of such indices are studies of globalization and its impacts on inequality, poverty and economic growth. Concerning the measurement of globalization, Heshmati (2006a and 2006b) introduces two composite indices of globalization. The first index is based on the Kearney/Foreign Policy magazine (2002) and the second is obtained from a principal component analysis. They indicate the level of globalization and show how it has developed over time for different countries. The indices are composed of four main components: economic integration, personal contact, technology and political engagement, each generated from a number of indicators. The indices were also used in a regression analysis framework to study the causal relationships between income inequality, poverty, economic growth and globalization. The results show evidence of a weak and negative relationship between globalization and income inequality and poverty. An important index of globalization based on similar methodology, but comprehensive data is the KOF index<sup>11</sup> (see also Dreher, 2006; and Dreher, Gaston and Martens, 2008).

There are at least two parametric indices employed for computing an index of a development process: the principal component (PC) or factor analysis (FA). In this paper, we introduce a Value Development Index, based on WVS data. Since the two methods in normalized form give PC scores with unit variance, the PC is more frequently used in the analysis of a development process.<sup>12</sup> PC analysis is a multivariate technique used for examining

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<sup>11</sup> The 2013 version of the index and underlying data are available at <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/>

<sup>12</sup> Principal Component analysis was originally developed by Pearson (1901) and further improved by Hotelling (1933). The method has been employed in many areas including in computation of a globalization index (Heshmati, 2006a; Andersen and Herbertsson, 2003), an environmental index (Kang, 2002) and a simple globalization index using trade and financial openness by Agénor (2003). Heshmati and Oh (2007) used the

relationships within a set of interrelated quantitative variables. The principal components computed; each is a linear combination of the original indicators with coefficients equal to the *Eigen vectors* of the correlation of the covariance matrix. The principal components are sorted according to the descending order of the *Eigenvalues*, which are equal to the variance of the components. PC analysis is a way to uncover approximate linear dependencies among the indicators. Unlike in a traditional least squares estimation method case, where the vertical distance between the observed and the fitted line is minimized, here the sum of the squared residuals is measured as distances from the point to the first principal axis.

As part of the analysis, the *Eigenvalues* and *Eigenvectors* are investigated. Only *Eigenvalues* bigger than 1.0 are used in the computation of development process indices. The *Eigenvalues* are declining from the first component to other components. By looking at the *Eigenvectors*, it becomes evident which indicators form a specific component and the nature of their effects. In each sub-component, an indicator with an *Eigenvector* exceeding 0.30 is considered statistically as a significant contributor to the principal component.

Each of the indices has its own advantages and disadvantages. They can be used to measure the state of development among countries and attribute it to the possible underlying causes. A breakdown of the index into major components provides possibilities to identify positive and negative factors contributing to the development. The structure of the components is determined by the researcher. In practice the researchers use only the first principal component in the computation of a parametric index and in the ranking the countries studied. This method has the disadvantage in that it ignores the information embodied in the remaining indicators. One alternative to account for the information embodied in all principal components with an *Eigenvalue* bigger than one is to use a weighted average PC index. In the aggregation of the principal components, one can use their explained share of the total variance as weights. This method of aggregation will allow the utilization of information from all indicators of an outcome. Lim and Nguyen (2014) discuss alternative weighting approaches to computing indices of economic activity.

It should be emphasized that the PC method is generally a very useful method to reduce the complexity of the data with multi-dimensions. However, the linear combinations of the different dimensions of interest may not be always easy to interpret. In sum, what is statistically reasonable may be neither economically nor normatively reasonable in the evaluation of development. The non-parametric and parametric indices are computed at each point of the data. In the context of globalization, they show how globalization has developed for different countries and regions over time. A breakdown of the index into major components provides possibilities to identify sources of globalization. The indices can be used to study the causal relationship between globalization, inequality, poverty, growth and a number of other variables.

The factor analysis examined above and various methods of factor rotation have been conducted in the context of linear factor analysis of continuous variables. The standard linear factor-analytic methodologies do not work well for dichotomous items or variables responses. This limitation has led to the development of nonlinear methods. In both cases, the determination of the association between items and factors is the same and is made using factor loading which is considered by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) as the correlation between the factor and items. Strongest loadings above a threshold value 0.3 or 0.4 are preferred. Nonlinear factor analysis is often used to identify both the presence and nature of multidimensionality in a set of test items. The loaded matrix is rotated in order to amplify the

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method for computation of Lisbon Development Strategy Index while Heshmati *et al.* (2008) used it to study child well-being in the high and middle income countries.

presence of simple unidirectional latent structures. This is a simple structure from a set of items as when each factor has a few items with high loadings and the rest has loadings near zero.

Finch (2006) conducted a simulation study to compare the performance of two commonly used methods of rotation, namely orthogonal (Varimax) and oblique (Promax) to identify the presence of a simple structure. Factor rotation involves a transformation of the initial factor loadings to obtain a greater simple structure without changing the underlying mathematical relationships in the data. Finch suggests the nonlinear factor analysis rotation method as the preferred method. Orthogonal rotations assume the factors are uncorrelated, while the oblique rotations assume the factors are correlated. The former contains the correlation between the factors, while the later measures the relationship between the individual factors and items. Promax takes the rotated matrix provided by Varimax and raises the loadings to powers where the transformed loading values reflect the simple structure better than in the case of Varimax (McLeod et al., 2001). The results from the Finch (2006) simulation study suggest that the two approaches are equally able to recover the underlying factor structure, though the promax method is better in the identification of the simple structure. Given conflicting recommendations in the literature, Dien et al. (2005) present a standard protocol for applying PC analysis to event-related potential datasets. The focus is on optimizing PC analysis with emphasis on matrix type, factor loading weighing, extraction and rotations using data simulations.

## **6. Re-analysis of Inglehart's data**

Convincing, as Inglehart's theory and the empirics of his contentions might appear at first sight, several essays and books questioned Inglehart's way of combining the analyzed variables into his dimensions or the linkage between his dimensions and democratic development (Hadenius, and Teorell, 2005; Haller, 2002; Haller and Hadler, 2006; Steenkamp and Geyskens, 2012; Tausch and Kharoui, 2011; Tausch and Moaddel, 2009). As we said, principle component analysis or factor analysis with orthogonal standard rotation of factors is a convenient, but not always the best way to reduce the relationships in a statistical correlation matrix between variables. It is of paramount importance to be of the "small print" here – what relationships exist between the factors, and which relationships are being allowed or we might even say are being dictated by the model? No correlations between the factors? Or are correlations being allowed? The statistical method chosen by Inglehart to reduce the complexity of the different components, derived by the initial principal components analysis to arrive at his final factor analytical results – the standard varimax rotation, which allows for no correlations between the chosen factors – today is increasingly being substituted in the literature by better and more advanced methods, like the promax rotation in factor analysis, which exactly allows such correlations between the factors (Finch, 2006). To make matters worse, Inglehart's choice of the WVS data did not always use the items, which are the best available in a maximum number of countries and theoretically of importance at the same time. His analyses are based on a theoretical maximum of 146,789 global interviews reflecting 22 variables; while we thought it more appropriate to base our analysis on a theoretical maximum of 180,041 global interviews for 30 variables.

In our research design, we worked with listwise deletion of missing values. At the end of the day, there were 92,289 persons around the globe with complete data for all the 30 variables of our research design. We worked with the very best documented WVS items. Seen in such a way, the present analysis is the biggest of its kind in social science history ever undertaken. Our "new" nine factors all make very much 'sense' and are free from problematic assumptions. We included all 30 original indicators, into the original principal components



and later the promax factor analysis. Our research design was thus intended to be more straightforward and simple, and in addition, it uses a more advanced and up to date statistical methodology. In contrast to Inglehart, we also include background variables, like gender, age and education. Thus, our analysis is not anymore a “gender-free zone”:

Insert Table 1: The research designs compared

Our re-analysis is based on 68 countries, and there is a good number of Muslim societies or predominantly Muslim societies with complete data covering all the 30 variables from around the globe. No substitution of missing values had to be carried out, and the SPSS 20 statistics program was applied, with the default options for factor analysis/promax rotation in place. Thus it is important to emphasize that any researcher around the globe could arrive at the same results as we did, independent of culture, religion or moral convictions.

Insert Table 2: The choice of our variables from the *World Values Survey*

The WVS data we used correspond to 88.96% of the total global population and 84.75% of the world’s Muslim population; and our re-analysis of the Inglehart world map of human values still yields results with complete data, which are a good sample of 56.89% of the global population and 56.16% of the global Muslim population.<sup>13</sup>

## 7. The final factor analytical model

Graph 2 shows the *Eigenvalues* of our investigation; with the first two factors way past any linear continuation of the factors 10-29, shown in the x-axis. Eight of our nine factors [economic permissiveness, traditional religion, racism, generational education gaps, distrust of the army and the press, authoritarian character, tolerance and respect, and the ‘ego’ company (independence + selfishness) are not only well above *Eigenvalue* 1.0, but also way above the linear continuation of the *Eigenvalues* of factors 9–19. Following such a simple standard procedure of analyzing the *Eigenvalues*, we suggest to treat the results for factor 9 - rejection of the market economy and democracy - with some caution at least. For that reason, our Table 3 lists these results with *indented letters*.

Although its *Eigenvalue* is still above 1.0, its vicinity to the factors 10–19 is clearly visible. In all, our model explains some 47% of the total variance of the correlation matrix of the data for 30 variables from more than 90,000 interview partners of the WVS, with two factors explaining already more than 17% of the total variance in between them – economic permissiveness, and traditional religion, the two defining processes of global values and global value change today. We have highlighted all factor loadings from the rotated structure matrix (*Promax rotation* according to the SPSS 20 with *Kaiser normalization*) in different typing and shadings in order to facilitate our readers to arrive at their own independent opinions about our results.

We should emphasize the point that the correlations between the factors are not correlations between aggregations at the country level but reflect the correlations between the factors, to be extracted from the data at the individual level of more than 90,000 interview partners, across countries and across cultures. Under such conditions, correlations between factors of more than +/-0.10 are already to be considered high. Nevertheless we have to emphasize that the relationships between economic permissiveness, and traditional religion, the factors with *Eigenvalues* of 2.0 or above, and the rest of the nine factors under consideration here, all with an *Eigenvalue* of 1.0 or above, in no way sufficiently firmly confirm the expectations of militant contemporary secularism.

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<sup>13</sup> WVS five wave aggregated file 1981-2005 (new) available at <http://www.wvsevsnb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp>

Seven factors under consideration here are a new input for the entire global debate about human values. These include: the strength of economic permissiveness, the clear proof of the existence of a factor describing racism, the generation gap in education, connected with the value transformation processes, the existence of a joint political distrust factor against both the army and the press, which also exists in very rich Western democracies, the clear proof of an “authoritarian personality” factor, and a re-emergence of the Hofstede dimension of “long term orientation”, called here “*the ego company*”. Two factors bear great semblance to the results, achieved by Inglehart and his associates – traditional religion and tolerance + respect and post-materialism. Our readers are also invited to look at Table 4 for the correlations between the factors and Table 5 for the aggregate country results.

Insert Graph 2: Screeplot for our factor analysis

The following Tables are now to be considered as the main basis of our further interpretations, and form the nucleus of the new choropleth world maps of human values.

Insert Table 3: Structure matrix – Promax with Kaiser normalization

Insert Table 4: The correlations between the factors

Insert Table 5: The country means for the different new factors – mapping the new map of global values on earth

## 8. The new choropleth maps of global human values

Graph 1 depicted the Inglehart/Welzel map of human values. The real choropleth maps, Maps 3 to 11, designed by us on the basis of the preceding WVS data, now focus on our analysis and its geographical implications. We invite our readers first to assess the condensed variable definitions, immediately following from Table 3, and also to assess our list of the five highest and lowest placed countries for each of our nine factors. Readers are then invited to study each of the nine choropleth maps, from Map 3 through to Map 11.

### Factor 1. Economic permissiveness definition based on:

Justifiable: cheating on taxes

Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport

Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe

Justifiable: claiming government benefits

Best practice of avoiding it:

Bangladesh

Zimbabwe

Turkey

Tanzania

Morocco

Worst practice of avoiding it:

Serbia

Zambia

Philippines

Moldova

Thailand

### Factor 2. Traditional religion definition based on:

How important is God in your life

Important child qualities: religious faith

Negative loading: never attend religious services

Highest values:

Nigeria

Ghana

Jordan

Indonesia

Tanzania

Lowest values:

Russian Federation

Sweden

Czech Republic

Estonia

Germany

**Factor 3. Racism definition based on:**

[Rejecting] Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers

[Rejecting] Neighbors: People of a different race

Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming)

Best practice of avoiding it:

Sweden

Burkina Faso

Canada

New Zealand

Belarus

Worst practice of avoiding it:

Hong Kong

Bangladesh

Jordan

Thailand

India

**Factor 4. Generational education gap definition based on:**

Highest educational level attained

Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl

Negative loading Age

Negative loading Important child qualities: thrift saving money and things

Highest values:

Dominican Republic

Uganda

Kyrgyzstan

Nigeria

Peru

Lowest values:

Thailand

Mali

Poland

Czech Republic

Slovakia

**Factor 5. Distrust of the army and the press definition based on:**

[No] Confidence: The Press

[No] Confidence: Armed Forces

Negative loading: [Right wing] self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 10-right)

Best practice of avoiding it:

Viet Nam

Tanzania

Bangladesh

Jordan

India

Worst practice of avoiding it:

Germany

Argentina

Macedonia

Trinidad and Tobago

Serbia

**Factor 6. The authoritarian character definition based on:**

Lack of social capital (Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can't be too careful])

Important child qualities: hard work

Important child qualities: obedience

Negative loading: Important child qualities: imagination

Negative loading: Important child qualities: independence

Best practice of avoiding it:

Norway

Sweden

Switzerland

New Zealand

Finland

Worst practice of avoiding it:

Russian Federation

Zimbabwe

Nigeria

Uganda

Trinidad and Tobago

### **Factor 7. Tolerance, respect and post-materialism definition based on:**

Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people

Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility

Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl

Negative loading: Important child qualities: hard work

Best practice:

Sweden

Norway

Switzerland

Finland

Germany

Worst practice:

Mali

Burkina Faso

Ethiopia

Nigeria

Bangladesh

### **Factor 8. The “ego company” definition based on:**

Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility

Important child qualities: independence

Negative loading: Important child qualities: unselfishness

Negative loading: Important child qualities: obedience

Highest values:

South Korea

Azerbaijan

Taiwan

Latvia

Estonia

Lowest values:

Burkina Faso

Zimbabwe

Jordan

Ghana

Tanzania

### **Factor 9. The rejection of the market economy and democracy defined based on:**

Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female)

Competition good or harmful

Political system: (It's very bad] having a democratic political system

Best practice of avoiding it:

Nigeria

Bangladesh

Morocco

India

Jordan

Worst practice of avoiding it:

Poland

Chile

Guatemala

Uruguay

Thailand

## **9. Regional value differences at the sub-national level**

The World Value Survey data also permit the research community to analyze the results not only at the national level, but also at the regional level, where the interviews were recorded.

The idea that global values are often present in the nations of the world in a highly regionally contradictory pattern, is relatively new in the research literature on the subject, but has tremendous political and also international implications. First studies in this direction were published, among others, by Torgier and Schneider (2007). Of the global regions with more than 30 interview partners each, it emerges for example that the 30 most economically permissive social climates are located in:

Copperbelt Province	Zambia
South East Serbia	Serbia & Montenegro
Central West Serbia	Serbia and Montenegro
Vulkaneshetskij	Moldova
Autonom Gaugasian Rep.	Moldova
Zhitomyr oblast	Ukraine
<b>Arges</b>	<b>Romania</b>
Sahel Region	Burkina Faso
Kirovograd oblast	Ukraine
Northern	Ghana

Assam	India
Mopti	Mali
Ararat Marz	Armenia
Southern	Ukraine
Central	Ukraine
Gomel oblast	Belarus
Sikasso	Mali
<b>Ziemelu reg.</b>	<b>Latvia</b>
Kampala	Uganda
Altiplano/Centro	Guatemala

The **30 superstars of economic law-abiding** (=highest negative loadings on the economic permissiveness factor) we find in the following regions of the world:

Kishoreganj	Bangladesh
<b>East Central Anatolia</b>	<b>Turkey</b>
Feni	Bangladesh
Mymensingh	Bangladesh
<b>Western Black Sea</b>	<b>Turkey</b>
Sylhet	Bangladesh
<b>Western Marmara</b>	<b>Turkey</b>
Chittagong	Bangladesh
Rangpur	Bangladesh
Habiganj	Bangladesh
Samegrelo	Georgia
Masvingo	Zimbabwe
Brahmanbaria	Bangladesh
Lampung	Indonesia
Mashonaland West	Zimbabwe
Addis Ababa	Ethiopia

East Java	Indonesia
<b>Eastern Black Sea</b>	<b>Turkey</b>
Midlands	Zimbabwe
Nator	Bangladesh
Northwest	Vietnam
Sirajgonj	Bangladesh
Marrakech-Tensift	Morocco
Punjab	India
<b>Eastern Marmara</b>	<b>Turkey</b>
Dareah Istimewa	Indonesia
Yogyakarta	
North central	Vietnam
<b>Western Anatolia</b>	<b>Turkey</b>
Dhaka	Bangladesh
Mashonaland Central	Zimbabwe
Barisal	Bangladesh

The 30 most **racist and xenophobic cultures** of the world are to be found in the following regions:

Sirajgonj	Bangladesh
Jharkhand	India
Brahmanbaria	Bangladesh
Kishoreganj	Bangladesh
Feni	Bangladesh
Nator	Bangladesh
Habiganj	Bangladesh
Sylhet	Bangladesh
Chittagong	Bangladesh
Barisal	Bangladesh
Banten	Indonesia
Dhaka	Bangladesh
Eastern	Ghana
The South	Thailand
Assam	India
Mymensingh	Bangladesh
Comilla	Bangladesh

<b>Central Anatolia</b>	<b>Turkey</b>
Madhya Pradesh	India
Rajasthan	India
The North	Thailand
West Bengal	India
Orrisa	India
Bihar	India
Northwest	Vietnam
Jeonbuk/North	Korea-South
Jeolla	
DKI	Indonesia
Copperbelt Province	Zambia
Southeast	Vietnam
Dareah Istimewa	Indonesia
Yogyakarta	

On a European level, one should not underestimate the long-term implications of such findings. It emerges, for example, that even in highly developed overseas democracies, regional value differences are considerable, as, say, between the deeply religious “Bible Belt” in the US South and the relatively secular New England. Secular Western Turkey quickly catches up with other European regions concerning the “Westernization” of values. Table 7 provides us with a first overview of the highest and lowest placed regions in the current EU members and the EU-accession countries, ranked by an average Value Development Index score which is based on the factor analytical results, presented on the country to country level in Table 5 and on the *Eigenvalues*, presented in Graph 2 of this work. The factor analytical parametric index comprises the following variables: avoiding economic permissiveness; avoiding racism; avoiding distrust of the army and the press; avoiding the authoritarian character; tolerance and respect; and avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy. Our Table 7 suggests huge regional differences in the EU, which will increase even more after the next proposed round of EU-enlargement.

The results from Table 8 reveal some very unfortunate results about the still persistent absence of a climate of social tolerance in some Turkey’s regions. Of all global regions with available data with 30 or more interview partners per region, the Turkish region of Western Marmara had rank 13 for the presence of an authoritarian character, and the Eastern Black Sea region was rank 41 of the more than 500 classified regions on this scale. Central Anatolia was global rank 18 in the global scale of regional racism, and the Western Black Sea region was rank 31 on this indicator. Central Anatolia was down at the very bottom of global regions with an achieved rank 457 in the scale of tolerance and respect and post-materialism, while the rankings for the Aegean region and partly also Istanbul were much more favorable.

Insert Table 7: The rankings of the best and the worst ranked regions in the EU and the candidate and potential candidate countries

Insert Table 8: The rank of Turkish regions in the geography of global values

## 10. Turkey - a Torn Country? Conclusions and Perspectives

In the following, we will use factor analytical scores to calculate a new Global Value Development Index, which uses the measurement scales (factors) of our work, and which hopefully will be recognized by religious and non-religious readers alike as measurement scales. These scales express the true degree of development of a civil society of a country, independent from the extent of traditional religion in the country, and also independent from the educational gap, and also independent from the factor “ego company”, where different cultural codes of global society might sharply diverge on the assessment on whether this is a “good” or “bad phenomenon”.

Thus, our Global Value Development Index country score combines: avoiding permissiveness, pessimism; avoiding racism; avoiding distrust of the army and the press; avoiding the authoritarian character; tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy. The weight, given to each factor, corresponds to the *Eigenvalues* listed in Graph 2 of this work.

We have to emphasize at the outset that the six dimensions combine phenomena, where Turkey is among the top 30% of global society, i.e. avoiding economic permissiveness and avoiding the distrust of the army and the press as the long-lasting influences of Kemalism on Turkish society at large. The combined indicator also includes two components, where Turkey’s performance is rather mediocre, compared to other countries (tolerance and respect and avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy), while the results for

avoiding racism and for avoiding the authoritarian character are among the bottom 20% of global society. Due to the positive performance concerning economic morality and also the trust in the empirically most important two pillars of a free and democratic society – the army and the press – and the weight that these factors have in the overall model of global values, the overall Turkish performance, emerging from Table 9, is quite positive. However, we have to emphasize that this performance corresponds – as the chapter heading suggests – to the experience of a culturally much divided country.

Our country results show that the five best ranked countries of our entire globe are all western democracies with a solid historical anchoring of their societies in the traditions of liberal Enlightenment, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, and Australia. But we already find among the next five countries the two developing countries Vietnam and Tanzania, and the EU-member countries Italy (predominantly Roman Catholic), Finland (predominantly Protestant) and Canada. Our global value development index, combining law-abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect; and a high acceptance of the market economy and democracy, ranks the predominantly Muslim nation of Morocco twelfth – just behind the United States of America – and still ahead the Latin American democracy Uruguay and Germany, to be followed by Bosnia and Indonesia.

Insert Table 9: The rankings of the countries of the world based on a new Global Value Development Index

While in general terms, our analysis is quite optimistic about the civil society foundations for a stable democracy for several Muslim countries, including Morocco, Bosnia, Indonesia, Turkey and Jordan, our analysis is fairly pessimistic for the former communist countries and successor states of the former Soviet Union, predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim alike. They excel hardly anywhere by an overwhelmingly positive performance, while the history of communism, which began to be implemented in Russia in 1917, destroyed the religious fabric of society and left a hyper-authoritarian society in place. Russia's percentile performance scores, which might be interpreted as a serious question mark about Russia's future trajectory, are the following: the 'ego' company (18%), avoiding the distrust of the army and the press (61%), avoiding economic permissiveness (78%), tolerance and respect (79%), avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy (87%), traditional religion (100%) and avoiding the authoritarian character (100%).

Our map, built on the results of Table 9, also shows that some of the assumptions by European decision makers, which pushed EU enlargement ahead of democratic consolidation after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, are wrong. The degree of development of a democratic civil society, characterized by law-abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect; and a female acceptance of the market economy and democracy is very poorly developed in several of the countries, admitted into the EU in 2004 and after. Our choropleth map of global value development (Map 12) then summarizes the results of Table 9 at a glance.

Insert Map 12: Combined global value development index

It is also interesting to note how neighboring countries, diverge in their value patterns: just compare Uruguay and Brazil, both predominantly Roman Catholic; Italy and Hungary, both predominantly Roman Catholic, Morocco and Mali, both predominantly Muslim, or for that matter, Morocco and Spain, just separated by the Straits of Gibraltar; Tanzania and Zambia, two neighboring African countries, and Vietnam and Thailand, two Asian neighboring countries. While Uruguay, Italy, Morocco, Tanzania and Vietnam are real frontrunners in overall value development, we find that Brazil; Hungary, Mali, Zambia, and Thailand are real



laggards in global value development. These phenomena hold independently of the attained development level of a country, measured by the Human Development Index of the UNDP. All of a sudden we discover, how exceptional countries like Uruguay, Italy, Morocco, Tanzania and Vietnam really are, and that global social science research would do well to focus on the value structures in these countries.

As we already noted, however, Turkey's overall performance is mainly due to its good ranking in the field of economic morality and also by the trust of its public in pillars of a free and democratic society. Using again the factor analytical method for the indicators: avoiding racism, absence of an authoritarian character, tolerance and respect, and avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy, we however realize that Turkey is only rank 61 of the global scale of 67 classified countries. Since such a ranking immediately follows from Tables 5 and 10, this contention does not need a further proof here.<sup>14</sup>

Of all the nations on earth with available data, there is a very high racism, a very pronounced authoritarian character, little tolerance and respect and postmaterialism, and a relatively high rejection of democracy and the market economy. Table 10 shows the factor analytically weighted results – with the *Eigenvalues* as the weights for the factors. For Turkey's accession to the EU, these results imply an important agenda for the future: the state of law and secular democracy in Turkey and respect for minority rights must be strengthened. The recent announcement that there will be special prisons for persons with a homosexual sexual orientation must be interpreted as the very last event in a recent long chain of actions on the part of the current, incumbent Turkish administration to de-Westernize the country in the name of a mystical “*Ummah*” instead of liberal democracy.<sup>15</sup>

Insert Table 10: Turkey's global ranking on tolerance and democracy indicators

Just how important the dimension of tolerance, respect and postmaterialism is for “effective democracy” we realize when we look at the bi-variate scatterplots on liberal values as the drivers of “effective democracy”, which we define with Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel, 2012 as the combination of civil rights with the absence of corruption (Graph 3).

Insert Graph 3: Liberal values as a drivers of “effective democracy”

In the long run, we are optimistic about the human development and security. All social scientific evidence seems to suggest that Turkey is indeed on a path of long-lasting changes and quite spectacular societal re-alignments. Among all the available social indicators of the world, infant mortality per 1.000 live births is among the most reliable, direct and completely documented indicator of the presence or absence of mass poverty. The economic basis for future coming changes in Turkey is the positive social development during the last decade and a half, which we can witness at the World Bank's data site with infant mortality now, in 2012, at 12.2, down from the 171.1 in 1960.<sup>16</sup> We realize at once how deeply AKP rule has transformed the formerly poor Turkish villages and urban *Gecekondu* (shanty towns). This spectacular social change is also evident from the fact that from 2000 onwards, Turkey increased its global ranking in overcoming infant mortality by another spectacular improvement of 16 ranks, only surpassed by Iran, South Korea, China and Tunisia.

Increased human development, rising life expectancy and reduced infant mortality are all a sign of rising human security. One of the robust lessons of global value research is that with increasing human security, peoples' longings for democracy, tolerance and civil society will increase. Issues of post-materialism will become important, precisely for those young

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<sup>14</sup> We relegated the results from the combined results for Serbia and Montenegro from the original list, so the number of countries was reduced from 68 to 67.

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/15/us-turkey-prisons-segregation-idUSBREA3E0VC20140415>

<sup>16</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

generations, who could afford themselves a decent education at one of the country's thriving Universities, including from Turkey's rapidly rising middle class. Their parents and grandparents were lifted out of poverty during the last decades. But as so often happens in history, a particular social and political movement might have served a country well for a longer period, only to be confronted with the situation that the very policies of a given regime reach its limits, and changed a country for the better, entering a period for which the thought patterns and receipts of the successful past no longer fit the needs of the future. Democracy, post-materialism, urban development, gender issues, and a "soft" and humanistic reading of the great plural religious heritage of the country will become the order of the day, precisely corresponding to the predictions of the theories of value change, which we presented in this essay.

To wind up our comparisons, we have calculated our results with population weighted averages for the Anglo-Saxon overseas democracies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States), which are the real frame of reference of any EU-2020 or European "Lisbon Strategy" comparison; the EU countries with available data (Bulgaria; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Estonia; Finland; Germany; Hungary; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden), Turkey and Russia. In terms of a "*Lisbon strategy*" to make Europe the most advanced economic and social region on earth, performing better than the United States or, for that matter, Australia, Canada, or New Zealand, Turkey's accession to the EU will not provide a critical mass of positive assets of values, like avoiding racism; avoiding the authoritarian character; tolerance and respect; and avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy.

Yeşilada and Noordijk (2010) already came to the conclusion that Turkish public has become more conservative (traditional on the Inglehart-Welzel factor of the traditional-secular/rational scale) during the period of 1995 to 2005. Their findings indicate that this is not a phenomenon that started with election of the AKP in 2002. The authors maintain that it is a trend that can be traced to 1995 and has intensified toward more conservatism since then. Our essay confirms their basic analysis. At the same time, Yeşilada and Noordijk think that a slight but significant shift in survival-self-expression values was observed: a regressive shift from 1990 to 2000 followed by a slight return toward more self-expression in 2005. Since 1994 the Turkish electorate as a bloc, Yeşilada and Noordijk argue, has moved to the right of the political spectrum. The authors suggest that Turkish society is far from values observed in many EU member states with respect to religiosity and Inglehart and Welzel's values map.

Abdollahian, Coan, Oh and Yeşilada (2012) however were correct in pointing out the basic dilemma for the AKP leadership under Erdoğan: Turkey as a high-performer on the Human Development Index dimension will sooner or later face the enormous pressures in the direction of democratization and self-expression values, which any society around the globe faces, when human development is in a rapid and positive direction. The authors say that economic progress has important implications for the evolution of rational-secular and self-expression value orientations. Specifically, the interactive relationship between progress and value orientations suggests, Abdollahian et al. argue, that major changes in existential conditions moderate the ebb and flow of cultural evolution. The expected rate of change in both rational-secular values and self-expression are related to where a nation is located in the development process. Moreover, Abdollahian et al. (2012) derive predictions about a zone of democratic transition and a zone of revolutionary change. Revolutionary change in political institutions suggests pronounced forces for change when political expectations fail to align with political realities. Nations could become trapped in an oscillating system characterized by unmet demands for political change and instability. Economic progress is a necessary condition for successful secularization and expressive political behavior, which precede lasting democratic institutions. The real test for Erdoğan and the AKP will come when Turkey

enters the phase of information and knowledge based services and will ever-more face the impact that technology has on culture, politics, and development. In Huntington's view "A bridge... is an artificial creation connecting two solid entities but is part of neither. When Turkey's leaders term their country a bridge, they euphemistically confirm that it is torn." (Huntington 1996: 149)

Graph 4 and Table 11 support our verdict that the member countries of the EU and the European Commission should carefully weigh the costs and benefits of further enlargements, also in terms of the value balances in comparison to the world's leading democracies and the ascending democracies in Latin America and other regions of the world, which conform much better to the essence of the values of the Enlightenment.

Insert Graph 3: Liberal values as a drivers of "effective democracy".

Insert Graph 4: Population-weighted value structures for selected countries and country groups.

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**Table 1: The research designs compared**

	<b>Inglehart and associates</b>	<b>Our re-analysis</b>
Choice and naming of the dimensions	ex ante, perhaps controversial, for example that survival values (and not tradition values) include the divorce and abortion item and the limits on selling foreign goods item, while the item on incomes and jobs, currently listed in the traditional values dimensions, very plausibly might be listed under the survival dimension	ex post, as suggested by the empirical results; the results were compared to the literature
Factor analytical design	standard factor analysis using orthogonal varimax rotation (does not allow for correlations between the factors)	more advanced versions of factor analysis, allowing for relationships between the factors (Promax rotation)
Inclusion of socio-economic background variables like age, education in the model	no	yes
Number of countries, considered in the analysis	65	68
Number of variables in the original analysis	22 variables/later reduced to 10	30
Results are based on items, available for at least the following number of respondents	146,789	180,041
% of total variance explained at the individual analysis level	26% (traditional values) + 13% (survival values)	47. 89%

**Table 2: The choice of our variables from the *World Values Survey***

Variable label	Interpretation of the variable according to the highest numerical value	Observations
Age	Age	247,978
Competition good or harmful	Competition good or harmful	203,976
Confidence: Armed Forces	[No] Confidence: Armed Forces	231,665
Confidence: The Press	[No] Confidence: The Press	236,529
Highest educational level attained	Highest educational level attained	230,283
How important is God in your life	How important is God in your life	240,112
How often do you attend religious services	[Never attend religious services. Scale: ] How often do you attend religious services	238,981
Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming)	Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming)	187,066
Important child qualities: determination and perseverance	Important child qualities: determination and perseverance	247,782
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility	Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility	255,656
Important child qualities: hard work	Important child qualities: hard work	253,331
Important child qualities: imagination	Important child qualities: imagination	252,238
Important child qualities: independence	Important child qualities: independence	255,656
Important child qualities: obedience	Important child qualities: obedience	255,656
Important child qualities: religious faith	Important child qualities: religious faith	253,503
Important child qualities: thrift , and saving money and things	Important child qualities: thrift , and saving money and things	255,656
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	255,656
Important child qualities: unselfishness	Important child qualities: unselfishness	252,238
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	224,394
Justifiable: cheating on taxes	Justifiable: cheating on taxes	232,012
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them	Justifiable: claiming government benefits	230,882
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	243,824
Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can't be too careful])	Lack of social capital (Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can't be too careful])	246,798
Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers	[Rejecting] Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers	225,868
Neighbors: People of a different race	[Rejecting] Neighbors: People of a different race	231,410
Political system: having a democratic political system	Political system: (It's very bad] having a democratic political system	193,889
Satisfaction with your life	Satisfaction with your life	252,679
self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 10-right)	[Right wing] self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 10-right)	180,041
Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female)	Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female)	252,941
University is more important for a boy than for a girl	Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl	207,655

**Table 3: Structure matrix – Promax with Kaiser normalization**

	economic permissiveness	traditional religion	racism	generational education gaps	distrust of the army and the press	authoritarian character	tolerance and respect + post-materialism	the 'ego' company (independence + selfishness)	rejection of the market economy and democracy
Age	-0.169	-0.071	-0.026	<b>-0.680</b>	-0.022	-0.037	0.195	0.114	<i>-0.135</i>
Competition good or harmful	0.155	-0.059	0.020	-0.163	0.064	-0.093	-0.076	-0.101	<b>0.556</b>
[No] Confidence: Armed Forces	0.079	-0.087	-0.054	0.157	<b>0.757</b>	-0.035	0.014	0.032	<i>0.111</i>
[No] Confidence: The Press	-0.016	-0.090	-0.076	-0.020	<b>0.759</b>	-0.010	0.120	0.039	<i>-0.007</i>
Highest educational level attained	-0.041	-0.098	-0.094	<b>0.648</b>	0.078	-0.195	0.165	0.158	<i>-0.136</i>
How important is God in your life	-0.039	<b>0.813</b>	0.035	-0.026	-0.123	0.200	-0.076	-0.106	<i>0.054</i>
[Never attend religious services. Scale: ] How often do you attend religious services	0.018	<b>-0.800</b>	-0.064	0.033	0.138	-0.119	0.108	0.080	<i>-0.021</i>
Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming)	0.003	0.089	<b>0.302</b>	-0.191	0.107	0.227	0.097	0.044	<i>0.095</i>
Important child qualities: determination and perseverance	0.002	-0.232	0.015	0.282	-0.003	-0.104	0.114	0.114	<i>-0.192</i>
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility	-0.043	-0.186	-0.044	0.071	-0.009	-0.028	<b>0.462</b>	<b>0.408</b>	<i>0.071</i>
Important child qualities: hard work	0.007	0.033	-0.023	-0.029	-0.200	<b>0.437</b>	<b>-0.500</b>	0.256	<i>-0.148</i>
Important child qualities: imagination	0.000	-0.098	-0.022	0.159	0.082	<b>-0.613</b>	-0.074	0.005	<i>0.032</i>
Important child qualities: independence	-0.020	-0.133	0.057	0.207	0.067	<b>-0.508</b>	0.007	<b>0.353</b>	<i>0.031</i>
Important child qualities: obedience	0.030	0.268	0.035	-0.158	-0.043	<b>0.300</b>	-0.201	<b>-0.562</b>	<i>0.031</i>
Important child qualities: religious faith	-0.028	<b>0.741</b>	0.041	-0.065	-0.038	0.166	-0.082	-0.169	<i>-0.007</i>
Important child qualities: thrift , and	0.006	-0.069	0.080	<b>-0.338</b>	-0.097	0.212	-0.282	0.260	<i>0.170</i>

saving money and things									
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	-0.064	-0.029	-0.104	-0.009	0.026	0.033	<b>0.623</b>	-0.032	-0.072
Important child qualities: unselfishness	-0.008	-0.013	-0.024	0.063	-0.016	-0.107	0.131	<b>-0.644</b>	0.031
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	<b>0.779</b>	-0.059	-0.002	0.079	0.066	0.021	-0.078	-0.026	0.112
Justifiable: cheating on taxes	<b>0.791</b>	-0.103	0.020	0.047	0.084	0.018	-0.089	0.021	0.026
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them	<b>0.716</b>	0.006	0.059	-0.003	0.017	0.041	-0.112	-0.053	0.132
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	<b>0.736</b>	0.015	0.070	0.001	0.006	0.049	-0.132	-0.024	0.058
Lack of social capital (Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can't be too careful])	0.037	0.149	0.073	0.085	0.164	<b>0.562</b>	-0.238	0.058	0.121
[Rejecting] Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers	0.039	0.025	<b>0.845</b>	-0.064	-0.076	0.045	-0.113	0.018	0.003
[Rejecting] Neighbors: People of a different race	0.043	0.059	<b>0.827</b>	-0.055	-0.115	0.026	-0.161	0.006	-0.008
Political system: (It's very bad] having a democratic political system	0.175	-0.106	0.097	-0.087	0.136	0.246	-0.239	-0.009	<b>0.458</b>
[Right wing] self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 10-right)	0.005	0.193	0.164	-0.063	<b>-0.300</b>	0.045	-0.035	0.095	-0.145
Sex (Gender) (1=male; 2=female)	-0.079	0.165	-0.045	0.167	-0.021	-0.011	0.216	0.061	<b>0.661</b>
Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl	-0.153	-0.064	-0.182	<b>0.384</b>	0.087	-0.160	<b>0.399</b>	-0.042	0.177

**Table 4: The correlations between the factors**

				Matrix of components				
	<b>Economic permissiveness</b>	<b>Traditional religion</b>	<b>Racism</b>	<b>Generational education gaps</b>	<b>Distrust of the army and the press</b>	<b>Authoritarian character</b>	<b>Tolerance and respect + post-materialism</b>	<b>The 'ego' company (independence + selfishness)</b>
Traditional religion	-0.051							
Racism	0.067	0.063						
Generational education gaps	0.010	-0.036	<b>-0.103</b>					
Distrust of the army and the press	0.058	<b>-0.122</b>	-0.069	0.084				
Authoritarian character	0.055	<b>0.190</b>	0.064	<b>-0.192</b>	-0.042			
Tolerance and respect + post-materialism	<b>-0.175</b>	-0.090	<b>-0.144</b>	<b>0.119</b>	0.072	<b>-0.276</b>		
The 'ego' company (independence + selfishness)	-0.046	<b>-0.173</b>	0.034	0.058	-0.028	0.014	-0.004	
Rejection of the market economy and democracy	0.093	0.034	0.018	0.030	<b>0.117</b>	0.045	-0.005	-0.027

**Table 5: The country means for the different new factors – mapping the new map of global values on earth**

	<b>Economic permissiveness</b>	<b>Traditional religion</b>	<b>Racism</b>	<b>Generational education gaps</b>	<b>Distrust of the army and the press</b>	<b>Authoritarian character</b>	<b>Tolerance and respect + post-materialism</b>	<b>The ‘ego’ company (independence + selfishness)</b>	<b>Rejection of the market economy and democracy</b>
Albania	0.094	-0.056	-0.137	-0.201	0.214	0.114	-0.149	-0.060	-0.229
Argentina	-0.090	0.101	-0.369	-0.103	0.557	0.050	0.067	0.037	0.147
Armenia	0.476	-0.471	-0.022	0.237	-0.060	0.332	-0.596	0.287	-0.030
Australia	-0.340	-0.569	-0.387	0.004	0.275	-0.516	0.554	-0.241	-0.166
Azerbaijan	0.283	-0.112	-0.135	0.297	0.204	0.183	-0.504	0.683	-0.169
Bangladesh	-0.589	0.839	1.712	-0.022	-0.854	-0.286	-0.626	0.457	-0.463
Belarus	0.520	-0.746	-0.413	-0.035	0.000	0.555	-0.508	0.323	0.010
Bosnia and Herz.	-0.304	-0.087	0.000	0.010	-0.128	-0.044	-0.083	-0.143	-0.172
Brazil	0.525	0.583	-0.373	-0.071	-0.037	0.503	-0.153	-0.429	0.346
Bulgaria	-0.188	-0.776	-0.037	0.028	-0.282	0.257	-0.258	0.196	-0.037
Burkina Faso	0.128	0.859	-0.440	-0.225	-0.243	0.450	-0.825	-0.710	-0.228
Canada	-0.284	-0.183	-0.424	0.038	0.018	-0.437	0.499	-0.112	-0.003
Chile	0.225	0.147	-0.139	-0.131	0.223	-0.131	0.209	-0.316	0.457
Cyprus	-0.146	0.068	0.040	0.154	-0.026	0.056	0.194	-0.204	-0.017
Czech Republic	0.286	-0.986	0.112	-0.448	0.180	0.496	-0.134	0.266	-0.079
Dominican Rep.	-0.220	0.653	-0.079	0.920	0.273	0.159	0.282	0.064	-0.030
Estonia	0.041	-0.944	-0.110	0.095	0.081	0.406	-0.231	0.560	-0.108
Ethiopia	-0.343	0.711	-0.114	0.250	0.429	-0.493	-0.759	-0.062	0.137
Finland	-0.162	-0.664	-0.046	-0.168	-0.059	-0.680	0.811	-0.018	0.187
Georgia	-0.054	0.179	-0.080	0.208	-0.075	0.335	-0.228	0.510	-0.178
Germany	-0.068	-0.928	-0.256	-0.268	0.563	-0.521	0.629	0.529	0.132
Ghana	-0.098	1.120	0.097	0.054	-0.688	0.461	-0.464	-0.584	-0.402
Guatemala	0.535	0.806	-0.354	0.125	0.310	0.236	-0.120	-0.546	0.424
Hong Kong	-0.048	-0.856	1.801	-0.193	0.008	-0.236	-0.575	-0.164	0.222
Hungary	0.467	-0.716	0.256	-0.132	0.353	0.057	0.455	0.074	0.075
India	-0.064	0.260	0.704	-0.044	-0.824	0.133	-0.464	-0.100	-0.436

Indonesia	-0.412	1.032	0.591	0.268	-0.366	-0.218	0.017	0.182	-0.110
Italy	-0.362	0.005	-0.240	0.093	0.153	-0.346	0.579	0.041	-0.032
Jordan	-0.207	1.118	1.329	0.095	-0.824	-0.160	0.058	-0.695	-0.403
Kyrgyzstan	0.117	-0.185	0.047	0.433	0.041	0.239	-0.409	0.419	0.175
Latvia	0.478	-0.712	-0.115	0.046	0.319	0.511	-0.144	0.561	0.018
Lithuania	0.169	-0.376	0.167	0.047	-0.011	0.289	-0.360	0.487	0.080
Macedonia	-0.134	-0.191	0.362	0.056	0.508	-0.035	0.458	0.002	0.058
Mali	0.509	0.743	0.087	-0.454	-0.619	0.278	-0.879	-0.453	-0.129
Mexico	0.505	0.322	0.208	0.075	0.093	-0.097	-0.137	-0.407	0.307
Moldova	0.579	-0.136	-0.098	-0.034	0.221	0.322	-0.385	0.359	0.184
Morocco	-0.419	0.855	-0.184	-0.086	-0.208	0.291	-0.232	-0.068	-0.463
New Zealand	-0.371	-0.675	-0.419	-0.085	0.125	-0.702	0.601	-0.090	-0.323
Nigeria	-0.139	1.126	0.040	0.371	0.012	0.640	-0.700	-0.489	-0.483
Norway	-0.271	-0.813	-0.288	0.165	0.151	-1.324	0.989	0.165	-0.088
Peru	0.067	0.594	-0.188	0.327	0.432	0.387	-0.072	-0.297	-0.018
Philippines	0.624	0.775	0.249	0.076	-0.397	0.405	-0.543	-0.009	0.270
Poland	-0.051	0.390	-0.080	-0.449	0.093	0.040	0.299	-0.057	0.496
Puerto Rico	-0.335	0.865	-0.216	0.231	-0.043	0.181	0.472	-0.163	0.005
Romania	-0.209	0.275	0.111	0.008	-0.279	0.084	-0.083	0.514	-0.374
Russian Fed.	0.339	-1.070	-0.251	-0.174	0.099	0.777	-0.462	0.363	0.259
Serbia	1.266	-0.152	0.285	0.078	0.445	0.143	-0.194	0.100	0.140
Serbia and Mont.	-0.178	-0.534	-0.112	-0.037	0.229	0.076	-0.101	0.106	-0.322
Slovakia	0.476	-0.176	-0.016	-0.411	-0.042	0.494	-0.139	0.221	-0.105
Slovenia	0.156	-0.639	0.029	0.017	0.384	-0.182	0.279	0.100	0.068
South Africa	-0.003	0.649	0.124	0.102	0.010	0.350	-0.120	-0.098	0.022
South Korea	-0.114	-0.507	0.563	0.272	-0.026	-0.182	-0.431	0.963	0.376
Spain	-0.135	-0.554	-0.372	-0.265	0.264	0.039	0.075	-0.158	0.126
Sweden	-0.109	-1.036	-0.443	0.045	0.311	-1.205	1.067	0.133	-0.137
Switzerland	-0.404	-0.565	-0.364	0.067	0.253	-1.067	0.968	0.296	-0.153
Taiwan	-0.206	-0.705	0.191	-0.140	0.325	-0.057	0.180	0.563	0.210
Tanzania	-0.448	1.008	0.034	-0.032	-1.063	0.056	-0.437	-0.564	-0.337
Thailand	0.561	0.300	0.722	-0.739	0.093	-0.297	-0.051	-0.334	0.382
Trinidad and Tob.	0.090	0.804	-0.307	-0.253	0.460	0.601	0.037	-0.256	0.060

Turkey	-0.460	0.271	0.300	0.026	-0.218	0.463	-0.217	0.024	0.083
Uganda	0.279	0.849	-0.051	0.540	-0.545	0.607	-0.503	-0.478	-0.256
Ukraine	0.553	-0.504	-0.219	-0.016	-0.020	0.345	-0.435	0.230	0.080
United States	-0.292	0.292	-0.250	-0.050	-0.076	-0.207	0.348	-0.038	-0.155
Uruguay	-0.270	-0.406	-0.311	-0.225	0.274	-0.427	0.442	-0.455	0.422
Venezuela	-0.047	0.417	0.142	0.159	-0.303	0.199	0.170	-0.369	0.202
Viet Nam	-0.341	-0.786	0.496	-0.266	-1.833	-0.122	-0.408	0.173	-0.292
Zambia	0.648	0.795	0.403	0.323	-0.086	0.329	-0.584	-0.343	-0.012
Zimbabwe	-0.468	0.876	-0.063	0.049	-0.071	0.678	-0.405	-0.704	-0.144



**Table 6: Country ranks of global values**

	Avoiding economic permissiveness	Traditional religion	Avoiding racism	Generational education gaps,	Avoiding the distrust of the army and the press	Avoiding the authoritarian character	Tolerance and respect + post-materialism	The 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	Avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy
<b>Albania</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>12</b>
Argentina	32	32	9	49	66	28	23	30	51
Armenia	54	46	37	11	22	48	62	16	31
Australia	12	51	6	38	54	7	8	49	17
Azerbaijan	50	37	25	7	46	38	57	2	16
Bangladesh	1	11	66	40	3	13	63	10	3
Belarus	59	58	5	43	31	62	58	14	37
<b>Bosnia and Hetz.</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>15</b>
Brazil	60	21	7	46	26	60	38	57	61
Bulgaria	23	59	36	33	12	42	44	20	28
Burkina Faso	45	8	2	57	14	55	66	67	13
Canada	16	41	3	32	35	9	9	43	35
Chile	48	31	23	50	49	20	18	52	66
Cyprus	25	33	42	16	27	30	19	48	33
Czech Republic	51	65	48	64	45	59	33	17	27
Dominican Republic	19	18	32	1	52	36	16	28	30
Estonia	40	64	28	20	37	54	42	5	24
Ethiopia	10	17	27	10	61	8	65	38	49
Finland	24	53	35	53	23	5	4	34	54
Georgia	35	30	30	13	20	49	41	8	14

Germany	33	63	15	62	67	6	5	6	48
Ghana	31	2	46	27	6	56	55	64	6
Guatemala	61	12	11	17	55	40	31	62	65
Hong Kong	37	62	67	55	32	14	60	47	57
Hungary	53	57	55	51	59	31	12	27	43
India	34	29	63	44	4	34	54	42	4
Indonesia	6	4	62	9	10	15	26	21	23
Italy	9	34	18	21	44	11	7	29	29
Jordan	21	3	65	19	5	19	24	65	5
Kyrgyzstan	44	42	44	3	36	41	49	11	52
Latvia	56	56	26	30	57	61	36	4	38
Lithuania	47	44	51	29	30	44	45	9	44
<b>Macedonia</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>40</b>
Mali	58	16	45	66	7	43	67	58	22
Mexico	57	24	53	24	39	22	34	56	60
Moldova	64	38	29	42	48	46	46	13	53
Morocco	5	9	22	48	16	45	43	39	2
New Zealand	8	54	4	47	42	4	6	40	9
Nigeria	26	1	43	4	34	65	64	61	1
Norway	17	61	14	14	43	1	2	23	26
Peru	41	20	21	5	62	52	28	51	32
Philippines	65	15	54	23	9	53	59	33	59
Poland	36	23	31	65	38	27	15	36	67
Puerto Rico	13	7	20	12	24	37	10	46	36
Romania	20	27	47	37	13	32	30	7	7
Russian Federation	52	67	16	54	41	67	53	12	58
<b>Serbia</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>50</b>
Slovakia	55	40	38	63	25	58	35	19	25

Slovenia	46	52	40	35	60	18	17	26	42
South Africa	39	19	49	18	33	51	32	41	39
South Korea	29	48	61	8	28	17	50	1	62
Spain	27	49	8	60	51	26	22	45	47
Sweden	30	66	1	31	56	2	1	24	21
Switzerland	7	50	10	25	50	3	3	15	19
Taiwan	22	55	52	52	58	23	20	3	56
Tanzania	4	5	41	41	2	29	52	63	8
Thailand	63	25	64	67	40	12	27	53	63
Trinidad and Tobago	42	13	13	59	64	63	25	50	41
<b>Turkey</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>46</b>
Uganda	49	10	34	2	8	64	56	60	11
Ukraine	62	47	19	39	29	50	51	18	45
United States	15	26	17	45	19	16	14	35	18
Uruguay	18	45	12	58	53	10	13	59	64
Venezuela	38	22	50	15	11	39	21	55	55
Viet Nam	11	60	60	61	1	21	48	22	10
Zambia	66	14	59	6	18	47	61	54	34
Zimbabwe	2	6	33	28	21	66	47	66	20

**Table 7: The rankings of the best and the worst ranked regions in the EU, the candidate and potential candidate countries**

Region where the interview was conducted	Country	Avoiding economic permissiveness	Avoiding racism	Avoiding distrust of the army and the press	Avoiding the authoritarian character	Tolerance and respect + post-materialism	Avoiding the rejection of market economy and democracy	Regional development index	World Rank	Rank in the enlarged EU
Skåne	Sweden	0.745	0.928	0.309	0.999	0.971	0.584	0.756	3	1
Lappi	Finland	0.764	0.910	0.473	0.824	0.893	0.468	0.722	10	5
Jönköping	Sweden	0.756	0.880	0.238	0.781	0.979	0.528	0.694	21	9
Dolj	Romania	0.889	0.928	0.487	0.294	0.686	0.859	0.690	22	10
Rheinland-Pfalz	Germany	0.659	0.893	0.282	0.743	0.910	0.510	0.666	33	13
Emilia-Romagna	Italy	0.866	0.843	0.281	0.586	0.790	0.569	0.656	43	14
Montana	Portugal	0.860	0.906	0.330	0.430	0.681	0.583	0.632	71	23
<b>Central Serbia</b>	<b>Serbia and Mont.</b>	<b>0.807</b>	<b>0.887</b>	<b>0.381</b>	<b>0.325</b>	<b>0.618</b>	<b>0.629</b>	<b>0.608</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>36</b>
Kyrenia	Cyprus	0.830	0.760	0.460	0.446	0.585	0.525	0.601	108	42
Castilla Leon	Spain	0.894	0.891	0.330	0.387	0.626	0.447	0.596	115	49
Campania	Italy	0.770	0.834	0.255	0.486	0.786	0.354	0.581	138	58
<b>Eastern Black Sea</b>	<b>Turkey</b>	<b>0.926</b>	<b>0.740</b>	<b>0.446</b>	<b>0.138</b>	<b>0.693</b>	<b>0.534</b>	<b>0.579</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>60</b>
Metropolitana	Portugal	0.742	0.792	0.360	0.317	0.809	0.394	0.569	157	68
Osrednja Slovenska	Slovenia	0.635	0.799	0.204	0.546	0.743	0.463	0.565	169	73
Ruse	Bulgaria	0.809	0.862	0.459	0.256	0.550	0.427	0.561	178	78
Tartumaa	Estonia	0.808	0.691	0.431	0.263	0.504	0.626	0.554	193	84
<b>Ohridski</b>	<b>Macedonia</b>	<b>0.780</b>	<b>0.728</b>	<b>0.152</b>	<b>0.446</b>	<b>0.687</b>	<b>0.468</b>	<b>0.544</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>Tirana</b>	<b>Albania</b>	<b>0.644</b>	<b>0.923</b>	<b>0.217</b>	<b>0.411</b>	<b>0.483</b>	<b>0.550</b>	<b>0.538</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>104</b>
Thueringen	Germany	0.750	0.818	0.109	0.474	0.714	0.335	0.533	244	110
Prague	Czech Rep	0.547	0.759	0.295	0.263	0.693	0.619	0.530	257	115
<b>Center</b>	<b>Albania</b>	<b>0.614</b>	<b>0.743</b>	<b>0.355</b>	<b>0.312</b>	<b>0.546</b>	<b>0.602</b>	<b>0.529</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>116</b>
Arges	Romania	0.212	0.735	0.617	0.433	0.424	0.736	0.526	266	121
Central-Hungary	Hungary	0.528	0.680	0.220	0.346	0.814	0.510	0.516	289	130
Vaasan	Finland	0.733	0.669	0.292	0.468	0.733	0.190	0.514	295	132
Sofia-province	Bulgaria	0.677	0.762	0.395	0.323	0.471	0.453	0.513	298	134

Bratislava County	Slovakia	0.425	0.747	0.336	0.303	0.699	0.522	0.505	323	138
Vilnius	Lithuania	0.699	0.782	0.363	0.258	0.454	0.447	0.501	335	140
Pomurska	Slovenia	0.588	0.775	0.233	0.375	0.664	0.366	0.500	337	142
<b>Poloski</b>	<b>Macedonia</b>	<b>0.661</b>	<b>0.842</b>	<b>0.077</b>	<b>0.274</b>	<b>0.604</b>	<b>0.498</b>	<b>0.493</b>	<b>362</b>	<b>149</b>
South-Danubian	Hungary	0.639	0.710	0.260	0.307	0.702	0.285	0.484	374	153
Pais Vasco	Spain	0.505	0.878	0.175	0.388	0.550	0.402	0.483	378	155
Isa-Virumaa	Estonia	0.603	0.839	0.286	0.204	0.411	0.544	0.481	383	157
Daugavpils	Latvia	0.707	0.888	0.242	0.126	0.418	0.500	0.480	386	158
Limassol	Cyprus	0.675	0.723	0.390	0.299	0.585	0.188	0.477	396	160
Northern Slovakia	Slovakia	0.471	0.769	0.338	0.199	0.507	0.506	0.465	419	167
<b>Central Anatolia</b>	<b>Turkey</b>	<b>0.821</b>	<b>0.317</b>	<b>0.509</b>	<b>0.318</b>	<b>0.361</b>	<b>0.400</b>	<b>0.455</b>	<b>436</b>	<b>168</b>
Kaunas	Lithuania	0.551	0.711	0.337	0.323	0.423	0.308	0.442	465	171
Západočeský kraj - West Bohemia -	Czech Rep.	0.499	0.642	0.278	0.195	0.448	0.490	0.426	482	172
Ziemeļu reģ.	Latvia	0.355	0.881	0.169	0.193	0.423	0.488	0.418	488	174
<b>South East Serbia</b>	<b>Serbia and Mont.</b>	<b>0.040</b>	<b>0.662</b>	<b>0.244</b>	<b>0.262</b>	<b>0.505</b>	<b>0.309</b>	<b>0.337</b>	<b>509</b>	<b>176</b>

**Table 8: The rank of Turkish regions in the geography of global values**

Factor	Factor number	Global rank	Region where the interview was conducted
higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	4	49	Aegean
authoritarian character	6	127	Aegean
rejection of the market economy and democracy	9	133	Aegean
the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	8	140	Aegean
traditional religion	2	299	Aegean
tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	7	339	Aegean
distrust of the army and the press	5	364	Aegean
racism	3	373	Aegean
permissiveness, pessimism	1	383	Aegean
<b>racism</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>Central Anatolia</b>
the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	8	149	Central Anatolia
traditional religion	2	154	Central Anatolia
rejection of the market economy and democracy	9	167	Central Anatolia
authoritarian character	6	236	Central Anatolia
higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	4	380	Central Anatolia
permissiveness, pessimism	1	398	Central Anatolia
<b>distrust of the army and the press</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>454</b>	<b>Central Anatolia</b>
<b>tolerance and respect + postmaterialism</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>457</b>	<b>Central Anatolia</b>
authoritarian character	6	59	East Central Anatolia
traditional religion	2	136	East Central Anatolia
racism	3	143	East Central Anatolia
tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	7	200	East Central Anatolia
higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	4	254	East Central Anatolia
the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	8	255	East Central Anatolia
distrust of the army and the press	5	395	East Central Anatolia
rejection of the market economy and democracy	9	395	East Central Anatolia
<b>permissiveness, pessimism</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>510</b>	<b>East Central Anatolia</b>
<b>authoritarian character</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>Eastern Black Sea</b>
tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	7	132	Eastern Black Sea
higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	4	142	Eastern Black Sea
racism	3	155	Eastern Black Sea
traditional religion	2	170	Eastern Black Sea
the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	8	346	Eastern Black Sea
rejection of the market economy and democracy	9	354	Eastern Black Sea
<b>distrust of the army and the press</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>403</b>	<b>Eastern Black Sea</b>
<b>permissiveness, pessimism</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>494</b>	<b>Eastern Black Sea</b>
the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	8	105	Eastern Marmara
higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	4	143	Eastern Marmara
authoritarian character	6	161	Eastern Marmara
traditional religion	2	172	Eastern Marmara
racism	3	179	Eastern Marmara
rejection of the market economy and democracy	9	244	Eastern Marmara
tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	7	249	Eastern Marmara
<b>distrust of the army and the press</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>Eastern Marmara</b>

<b>permissiveness, pessimism</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>Eastern Marmara</b>
authoritarian character	6	124	Istanbul
racism	3	128	Istanbul
rejection of the market economy and democracy	9	163	Istanbul
traditional religion	2	164	Istanbul
tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	7	247	Istanbul
the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	8	281	Istanbul
higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	4	285	Istanbul
distrust of the army and the press	5	341	Istanbul
<b>permissiveness, pessimism</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>479</b>	<b>Istanbul</b>
racism	3	84	Mediterranean
authoritarian character	6	103	Mediterranean
traditional religion	2	197	Mediterranean
rejection of the market economy and democracy	9	236	Mediterranean
the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	8	306	Mediterranean
permissiveness, pessimism	1	392	Mediterranean
tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	7	392	Mediterranean
distrust of the army and the press	5	399	Mediterranean
<b><i>higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)</i></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>404</b>	<b><i>Mediterranean</i></b>
racism	3	102	North Eastern Anatolia
higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	4	115	North Eastern Anatolia
rejection of the market economy and democracy	9	176	North Eastern Anatolia
traditional religion	2	182	North Eastern Anatolia
distrust of the army and the press	5	182	North Eastern Anatolia
authoritarian character	6	203	North Eastern Anatolia
tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	7	299	North Eastern Anatolia
the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	8	450	North Eastern Anatolia
<b>permissiveness, pessimism</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>466</b>	<b>North Eastern Anatolia</b>
racism	3	85	South Eastern Anatolia
authoritarian character	6	118	South Eastern Anatolia
distrust of the army and the press	5	132	South Eastern Anatolia
rejection of the market economy and democracy	9	158	South Eastern Anatolia
higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	4	196	South Eastern Anatolia
the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	8	211	South Eastern Anatolia
traditional religion	2	262	South Eastern Anatolia
tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	7	326	South Eastern Anatolia
permissiveness, pessimism	1	332	South Eastern Anatolia
authoritarian character	6	55	Western Anatolia
racism	3	108	Western Anatolia
rejection of the market economy and democracy	9	123	Western Anatolia
traditional religion	2	177	Western Anatolia
higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	4	206	Western Anatolia
tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	7	270	Western Anatolia
distrust of the army and the press	5	286	Western Anatolia
the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	8	357	Western Anatolia
<b>permissiveness, pessimism</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>484</b>	<b>Western Anatolia</b>
<b><i>racism</i></b>	<b>3</b>	<b>31</b>	<b><i>Western Black Sea</i></b>
authoritarian character	6	143	Western Black Sea

traditional religion	2	158	Western Black Sea
tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	7	183	Western Black Sea
the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	8	319	Western Black Sea
higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	4	369	Western Black Sea
rejection of the market economy and democracy	9	397	Western Black Sea
<b>distrust of the army and the press</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>471</b>	<b>Western Black Sea</b>
<b>permissiveness, pessimism</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>507</b>	<b>Western Black Sea</b>
<i>authoritarian character</i>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>Western Marmara</b>
racism	3	68	Western Marmara
traditional religion	2	88	Western Marmara
rejection of the market economy and democracy	9	93	Western Marmara
the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	8	308	Western Marmara
tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	7	334	Western Marmara
<b>distrust of the army and the press</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>466</b>	<b>Western Marmara</b>
higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	4	497	Western Marmara
<b>permissiveness, pessimism</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>505</b>	<b>Western Marmara</b>



**Table 9: The rankings of the countries on a new Global Value Development Index**

Country	Value Development Index	Global Rank Value Development Index
Switzerland	3.84	1
Norway	3.77	2
Sweden	3.41	3
New Zealand	3.33	4
Australia	2.57	5
Canada	2.50	6
Vietnam	2.38	7
Tanzania	2.23	8
Italy	2.23	9
Finland	2.11	10
United States	2.06	11
Morocco	1.50	12
Uruguay	1.44	13
Germany	1.08	14
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.07	15
Indonesia	0.91	16
Romania	0.89	17
Spain	0.54	18
Cyprus	0.51	19
Dominican Republic	0.50	20
Bulgaria	0.34	21
Ghana	0.31	22
Zimbabwe	0.26	23
Ethiopia	0.08	24
<b>Turkey</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>25</b>
Venezuela	0.03	26
Jordan	0.01	27
Argentina	0.00	28
Poland	-0.07	29
Georgia	-0.11	30
Bangladesh	-0.20	31
India	-0.20	32
Albania	-0.36	33
Macedonia	-0.43	34
Slovenia	-0.47	35
Burkina Faso	-0.51	36
Estonia	-0.66	37
Chile	-0.69	38
South Africa	-0.79	39
Nigeria	-0.81	40
Peru	-0.94	41
Uganda	-0.95	42
Trinidad and Tobago	-1.04	43

Korea, South	-1.28	44
Kyrgyzstan	-1.36	45
Azerbaijan	-1.37	46
Lithuania	-1.53	47
Hungary	-1.69	48
Slovakia	-1.76	49
Brazil	-1.77	50
Czech Republic	-1.81	51
Mali	-1.83	52
Belarus	-1.87	53
Ukraine	-1.99	54
Guatemala	-2.00	55
Mexico	-2.10	56
Armenia	-2.13	57
Latvia	-2.22	58
Russia	-2.27	59
Moldova	-2.59	60
Thailand	-2.85	61
Philippines	-2.86	62
Zambia	-3.25	63

**Table 10: Ranking of the countries on tolerance and democracy indicators**

	<b>avoiding racism</b>	<b>absence of an authoritarian character</b>	<b>tolerance and respect + post-materialism</b>	<b>avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy</b>	<b>Overall Liberal Values Development Index</b>	<b>Global Rank Value Development Index</b>
Sweden	0.748	1.433	1.220	0.139	3.539	1
Norway	0.486	1.574	1.130	0.089	3.280	2
Switzerland	0.614	1.269	1.106	0.155	3.144	3
New Zealand	0.707	0.835	0.687	0.327	2.556	4
Australia	0.653	0.614	0.633	0.168	2.068	5
Canada	0.716	0.520	0.570	0.003	1.809	6
Germany	0.432	0.619	0.719	-0.134	1.637	7
Finland	0.078	0.809	0.927	-0.189	1.624	8
Italy	0.405	0.411	0.662	0.032	1.511	9
United States	0.422	0.246	0.398	0.157	1.223	10
Uruguay	0.525	0.508	0.505	-0.427	1.111	11
Puerto Rico	0.365	-0.215	0.539	-0.005	0.684	12
Spain	0.628	-0.046	0.086	-0.128	0.540	13
Argentina	0.623	-0.059	0.077	-0.149	0.491	14
Slovenia	-0.049	0.216	0.319	-0.069	0.418	15
Serbia and Mont.	0.189	-0.090	-0.115	0.326	0.309	16
Dominican Rep.	0.133	-0.189	0.322	0.030	0.297	17
Morocco	0.311	-0.346	-0.265	0.469	0.168	18
Chile	0.235	0.156	0.239	-0.462	0.167	19
Albania	0.231	-0.136	-0.170	0.232	0.157	20
Bosnia and Herz.	0.000	0.052	-0.095	0.174	0.132	21
Cyprus	-0.068	-0.067	0.222	0.017	0.105	22
Romania	-0.187	-0.100	-0.095	0.378	-0.004	23
Hungary	-0.432	-0.068	0.520	-0.076	-0.056	24
Poland	0.135	-0.048	0.342	-0.502	-0.073	25
Macedonia	-0.611	0.042	0.523	-0.059	-0.105	26
Peru	0.317	-0.460	-0.082	0.018	-0.207	27
Trinidad and Tob.	0.518	-0.715	0.042	-0.061	-0.215	28
Ethiopia	0.192	0.586	-0.868	-0.139	-0.228	29
Guatemala	0.598	-0.281	-0.137	-0.429	-0.249	30
Taiwan	-0.322	0.068	0.206	-0.213	-0.261	31
Tanzania	-0.057	-0.067	-0.499	0.341	-0.282	32
Georgia	0.135	-0.398	-0.261	0.180	-0.344	33
Azerbaijan	0.228	-0.218	-0.576	0.171	-0.395	34
Estonia	0.186	-0.483	-0.264	0.109	-0.452	35
Venezuela	-0.240	-0.237	0.194	-0.204	-0.486	36

Brazil	0.630	-0.598	-0.175	-0.350	-0.493	37
Bulgaria	0.062	-0.306	-0.295	0.037	-0.501	38
Burkina Faso	0.743	-0.535	-0.943	0.231	-0.505	39
Belarus	0.697	-0.660	-0.581	-0.010	-0.554	40
Latvia	0.194	-0.608	-0.165	-0.018	-0.596	41
Indonesia	-0.998	0.259	0.019	0.111	-0.608	42
Slovakia	0.027	-0.587	-0.159	0.106	-0.613	43
Ukraine	0.370	-0.410	-0.497	-0.081	-0.619	44
Mexico	-0.351	0.115	-0.157	-0.311	-0.703	45
South Africa	-0.209	-0.416	-0.137	-0.022	-0.785	46
Ghana	-0.164	-0.548	-0.530	0.407	-0.835	47
Moldova	0.165	-0.383	-0.440	-0.186	-0.844	48
Czech Republic	-0.189	-0.590	-0.153	0.080	-0.852	49
Viet Nam	-0.837	0.145	-0.466	0.296	-0.863	50
Uganda	0.086	-0.722	-0.575	0.259	-0.951	51
Kyrgyzstan	-0.079	-0.284	-0.467	-0.177	-1.008	52
Armenia	0.037	-0.395	-0.681	0.030	-1.008	53
Serbia	-0.481	-0.170	-0.222	-0.142	-1.015	54
Zimbabwe	0.106	-0.806	-0.463	0.146	-1.017	55
Lithuania	-0.282	-0.344	-0.411	-0.081	-1.118	56
Nigeria	-0.068	-0.761	-0.800	0.489	-1.140	57
Russian Fed.	0.424	-0.924	-0.528	-0.262	-1.290	58
Thailand	-1.219	0.353	-0.058	-0.387	-1.310	59
Mali	-0.147	-0.331	-1.005	0.131	-1.352	60
<b>Turkey</b>	<b>-0.506</b>	<b>-0.551</b>	<b>-0.248</b>	<b>-0.084</b>	<b>-1.389</b>	<b>61</b>
India	-1.188	-0.158	-0.530	0.441	-1.436	62
Jordan	-2.243	0.190	0.066	0.408	-1.579	63
South Korea	-0.950	0.216	-0.493	-0.381	-1.607	64
Zambia	-0.680	-0.391	-0.668	0.012	-1.727	65
Philippines	-0.420	-0.482	-0.621	-0.273	-1.796	66
Bangladesh	-2.890	0.340	-0.716	0.469	-2.797	67
Hong Kong	-3.040	0.281	-0.657	-0.225	-3.641	68


Table 11: Population-weighted value development indices for the Anglo-Saxon overseas democracies, the EU, Turkey, the countries of the West Balkan and the Russian Federation

	Anglo-Saxon overseas democracies	EU	Turkey	West-Balkan	Russian Federation
Avoiding economic permissiveness	0.745	0.254	1.162	-1.212	-0.856
Avoiding racism	0.465	0.294	-0.506	-0.242	0.424
Avoiding distrust of the army and the press	0.059	-0.308	0.283	-0.352	-0.129
Avoiding the authoritarian character	0.299	0.237	-0.551	-0.083	-0.924
Tolerance and respect + post-materialism	0.430	0.424	-0.248	-0.085	-0.528
Avoiding rejection of the market economy and democracy	0.146	-0.082	-0.084	0.018	-0.262
Global Value Development Index	2.143	0.819	0.056	-1.955	-2.275

Population weights for the West Balkan countries Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Macedonia and Serbia taken from:


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**Graph 1: Map of global human values according to Inglehart and associates (our own adaption) and the place of Turkey on it.**





Note: Turkey:  $x = -0,443$ ;  $y = -0,360$ . Source: adapted from Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "Changing Mass Priorities: The Link between Modernization and Democracy." *Perspectives on Politics*, June 2010 (Vol 8, No. 2) page 554. Graph 1 is the latest published version of the Inglehart/Welzel map.

**Graph 2: Screeplot for our factor analysis**



Indicators	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	% of variance explained	Cumulated percentage
Economic permissiveness	2.526	8.711	8.711
Traditional religion	2.472	8.523	17.234
Racism	1.688	5.822	23.056
Higher education of the younger generation	1.442	4.974	28.029
Distrust of the army and the press	1.298	4.475	32.504
Authoritarian character	1.189	4.099	36.604
Tolerance and respect	1.143	3.942	40.545
The 'ego' company	1.118	3.854	44.399
Rejection of the market economy and democracy	1.012	3.489	47.888

**Graph 3: Liberal values as a drivers of “effective democracy”**






Note: the evidence from the relationship between our liberal values development index and the tolerance and respect and postmaterialism factor on the one hand and effective democracy on the other hand.

Source: Our own calculations from Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel (2012) and the results of this work.




**Graph 4: Population-weighted value structures for selected countries and country groups.**




Notes: Anglo-Saxon overseas democracies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States) and the EU with available data (Bulgaria; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Estonia; Finland; Germany; Hungary; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden)


**Map 1: Inglehart: Secular Values. Data from the WVS waves 1-4**



**Map 2: Inglehart: Self-Expression Values. Data from the WVS waves 1-4**




### Map 3: Economic permissiveness




Justifiable: cheating on taxes  
 Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport  
 Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe  
 Justifiable: claiming government benefits

### Map 4: Traditional religion




How important is God in your life  
 Important child qualities: religious faith  
 Negative loading: never attend religious services

## Map 5: Racism




[Rejecting] Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers  
 [Rejecting] Neighbours: People of a different race  
 Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming)

## Map 6: Generational education gaps, a growing acceptance of female higher education and the rejection of thrift




Highest educational level attained  
 Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl  
 Negative loading Age  
 Negative loading Important child qualities: thrift saving money and things

### Map 7: Distrust of the army and the press




[No] Confidence: The Press  
 [No] Confidence: Armed Forces  
 Negative loading: [Right wing] self positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 10-right)

### Map 8: Authoritarian character




Lack of social capital (Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can't be too careful])  
 Important child qualities: hard work  
 Important child qualities: obedience  
 Negative loading: Important child qualities: imagination  
 Negative loading: Important child qualities: independence

### Map 9: Tolerance and respect + post-materialism




Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people  
 Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility  
 Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl  
 Negative loading: Important child qualities: hard work

### Map 10: The 'ego' company




Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility  
 Important child qualities: independence  
 Negative loading: Important child qualities: unselfishness  
 Negative loading: Important child qualities: obedience

### Map 11: Rejection of the market economy and democracy



Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female)  
 Competition good or harmful  
 Political system: (It's very bad) having a democratic political system

### Map 12: Combined global value development index



Note: avoiding permissiveness, racism, distrust of the army and the press, authoritarian character, rejection of the market economy and democracy; and practicing the values of tolerance and respect (weighted by the *Eigenvalues* of the promax factor analytical model)