本文提出了一种新的工资决定和工资不平等模型。在这个模型中，工资制定者制定工人的工资;他们这样做要么是直接的，如个人在工资委员会中投票，要么是间接的，如政党通过无数的社会、经济、财政和其他政策来产生工资。由工资设定者提出的建议(或由其政策产生的建议)形成一个分布，所有特定于工资设定者的分布被合并成一个单一的最终工资分布。可以有任意数量的工资设定者;一些工资设定者比其他人更重要;而且，工资设定者之间可能在工资分配和为特定工人建议的数额上存在分歧。我们使用概率论来推导初始结果，包括与分布无关的结果和特定于分布的结果。幸运的是，该模式的要素符合基本的民主原则。因此，该模型揭示了民主对工资不平等的影响。 These include: (1) The effects of the number of wage-setters and their power depend on the configuration of agreements and disagreements; (2) Independence of mind reduces wage inequality, and dissent does so even more; (3) When leaders of democratic nations seek to forge an economic consensus, they are unwittingly inducing greater economic inequality; (4) Arguments for independent thinking will be more vigorous in small societies than in large societies; (5) Given a fixed distributional form for wages and two political parties which either ignore or oppose each other's distributional ideas, the closer the party split to 50-50, the lower the wage inequality; and (6) Under certain conditions the wage distribution within wage-setting context will be normal, but the normality will be obscured, as cross-context mixtures will display a wide variety of shapes.